Keith Whittington: Tolerating Campus Dissent, Left and Right

WhittingtonThe reminders come nearly daily that tolerating freedom of speech and thought on college campuses—and in American society—is hard. It is very easy to say that we love freedom of speech in the abstract. It is much harder to adhere to that conviction when confronted with speech that we ourselves find to be, well, intolerable. When we encounter ideas or rhetoric that we find abhorrent, we are tempted to look for loopholes in the freedom of speech, to rationalize efforts to silence those who make us uncomfortable. This instinct is only natural and all too human, but it is an instinct at odds with the requirements of a liberal democracy and very much at odds with the ideals of a modern university.

The passing of Barbara Bush unfortunately became the occasion for another such reminder. An English professor at California State University, Fresno took to Twitter to celebrate the former first lady’s death, denouncing Bush as a “racist” and the mother of a “war criminal.” No stranger to provocative Twitter posts, the professor seemed to initially revel in the outrage she had generated before retreating from the increasingly intense public glare.

Fresno State president Joseph Castro was soon engaged in damage control, but in doing so did not represent the principles of either the university or the Constitution well. Castro did not content himself with reminding members of the public that the professor spoke only for herself and not the institution and did not even get around to emphasizing that universities are home to a large number of independent-minded individuals who hold a wide range of views and frequently disagree with one another. Instead, he chose to join the outraged public in denouncing a member of his own faculty for expressing views “contrary to the core values of our University,” which he identified as values of “empathy” and “respect.” The president subsequently emphasized that “we are all held accountable for our actions.” Indeed, the tweet was, in Castro’s view, “beyond free speech,” apparently because it was “disrespectful.”

Castro is, of course, correct that everyone is accountable for their actions. The question is what accounting is appropriate for appalling opinions expressed on a personal social media account. The speech of university professors can and should be criticized when it is wrong. Students and colleagues may choose to avoid quarrelsome professors. University professors are subject to discipline, and even termination, if they engage in professional misconduct. When American citizens who happen to be members of the faculty at a state university express unpopular political opinions in the public sphere, their speech is constitutionally protected from reprisals by state government officials, including university presidents. When members of the campus community spend their free time engaging in public debate, any university leader should refrain from asserting that “disrespectful,” uncivil, or odious comments are beyond the bounds of freedom of speech and subject to official sanction.

Universities should strive to nurture campus communities that are open to intellectual diversity and raucous debate. University professors should strive, even in their free time, to contribute positively to our social discourse and not to drag it further into the gutter. But freedom of speech is often messy and sometimes unpleasant. The disagreements among members of a diverse society are often deep and intense, and those disagreements will sometimes be expressed with passion. We are quick to recognize when others have offended us, but slow to recognize when we have given offense. We make greater progress in overcoming those disagreements and in making productive use of unconventional thinking, however, when we accept that we will sometimes be offended and we tolerate that with which we fervently disagree. Not every expressed idea is a good one. Not every disagreement will give way to greater insight. But intellectual and social progress is best made when we tolerate dissent rather than shout it down, when we criticize rather than punish, when we turn away from the provocateur rather than fan the flames.

Keith E. Whittington is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University and a leading authority on American constitutional theory and law. He is the author of Speak Freely: Why Universities Must Defend Free Speech.

Ya-Wen Lei: Ideological Struggles and China’s Contentious Public Sphere

This post has been republished by the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University.

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Ideology was a critical theme at China’s 19th Party Congress in October 2017. In his speech, President Xi Jinping emphasized China’s “cultural confidence” as well as “Chinese values.” Attempting to import any other kind of political regime, he argued, would fail to match China’s social, historical and cultural conditions. Interestingly, however, at the same time that he rejected foreign political models, Xi promoted China’s particular version of modernization as a valuable model for other countries.

At the domestic level, Xi stressed the importance of controlling ideology, regulating the internet, and actively attacking “false” views within China’s public sphere. For Xi, ideology is a powerful tool that can, at best, unify the Chinese people or, at worst, turn them against the Chinese state.

In fact, ideology has been a priority for Xi ever since he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. This focus is understandable, I argue, precisely given the rising influence of liberal ideology within China’s public sphere.

Let me illustrate this by discussing one example, explored in greater depth in my book, The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China. In Chapter 5, I analyze the political orientation of the top 100 opinion leaders on Weibo—one of China’s most popular social media sites—and the connections among them in 2015.

I classified Weibo opinion leaders into the following categories: political liberals, political conservatives, and others. I defined political liberals as those who express support on Weibo for constitutionalism (government authority derives from and should be limited by the constitution) and universal values (e.g., human rights, freedom, justice, equality), and political conservatives as those who argue against those principles. I classified as “others” those who expressed no views either way. I looked at people’s views on constitutionalism and universal values because these are particularly contested and politicized ideas in China given their association with Western liberal democracy. These are, in short, ideas that would not be popular in China if ideology were functioning “properly” from the government perspective.

Despite the Chinese government’s ideological control and censorship, I found that 58% of the top 100 Weibo opinion leaders in 2015 were political liberals, while only 15% were political conservatives. My analysis looked specifically at January of 2015, after the Chinese government launched its “purge the internet” campaign in August 2013 and arrested several opinion leaders. This was also after the government’s effort to use Weibo to create more “positive energy.” Presumably, then, the percentage of political liberals among opinion leaders might well have been even higher before the Chinese government’s intensified crackdowns.

In the following graph, I map the connections among the top 100 Weibo opinion leaders using social network analysis. Blue, red, and white nodes represent political liberals, political conservatives, and others, respectively. The graph reveals the greater level of influence of political liberals in general online, the dense connections among liberals themselves, and their seemingly greater influence on those who may be “on the fence” politically or simply more cautious about expressing their views of constitutionalism and universal values online. Importantly, political liberals would not have become so popular and influential had it not been for the direct and indirect endorsement of Chinese citizens.

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Figure: Top 100 Weibo opinion leaders. Note: An edge between two opinion leaders is directional, showing that one opinion leader follows the other on Weibo. Blue, red, and white nodes represent political liberals, political conservatives, and others, respectively. Squares, triangles, boxes, diamonds, and circles denote media professionals, lawyers and legal scholars, scholars in non-law disciplines, entrepreneurs, and others, respectively. Gray and black edges show“following” across and between people with the same political orientation, respectively.

In short, the graph reveals a situation that contrasts sharply with the Chinese public sphere the government would like to see. The dissemination of liberal discourse and ideology, as well as growing public criticism of social and political problems in China, has only heightened the Chinese state’s concerns regarding ideology.

So, is ideology even “working” in China—at least in the way Xi would like? If constitutionalism and universal values are Western views that need to be discouraged and even attacked as “false,” this map of online opinion leaders in China suggests the government has its work cut out for it. How this happened, how it has changed China’s public sphere, and whether and how the govenment might attempt to regain ideological control moving foward are all questions I explore futher in my book, The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China.

Ya-Wen Lei is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and an affiliate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. She is the author of The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China.

Banned Books Week: Remembering David Tod Roy & The Plum in the Golden Vase

Over the course of history and across cultures, books have been banned for various reasons: religious and political, sexual and social. From the Princeton University Press archives, perhaps none is more remarkable than The Plum in the Golden Vase or, Chin P’ing Mei. Equally remarkable is the book’s translator: Crowning nearly 50 years of scholarship, the late David Tod Roy published the fifth and final volume of his masterful translation of this ‘banned book’ in 2013, and I had the pleasure of working as his publicist. The culmination of this project marked the pinnacle of David’s career, one that too sadly coincided with his diagnosis with Lou Gehrig’s disease. In spite of his physical decline, David was wonderfully engaged and engaging during the months following the book’s publication, as interview requests poured in from The New York Times and beyond. He spoke thoughtfully about his lifelong love of Chinese literature, his adventurous youth as the child of Presbyterian missionaries in China, and what exactly led him to open up The Plum in the Golden Vase for the first time (Hint: it’s a pretty racy read).

Written anonymously, the late sixteenth-century novel that became Roy’s lifelong work is a jewel of Ming-era Chinese literature, presenting an impressively detailed picture of daily Chinese life. Famous for its unprecedented eroticism, the book was described by David Marche in the LA Review of Books as “Jane Austen meets hard-core pornography.” It will come as no surprise that the book was long banned, restricted to high officials in the Chinese government, had its erotic content edited out, or replaced with Latin. The interviews David Roy did about the book before his recent death, this one for the Tableau, touch on its history of censorship:

The Chin P’ing Mei has been banned by various Chinese governments ever since it first appeared, including that of Mao Zedong. Interestingly, Mao’s diary indicated that he was an avid fan of the novel and thought it was a profound work, but he didn’t want his citizens to read it. One edition was published under Mao’s aegis, but it was restricted only to upper levels of the Communist party.

Though the novel is about more than sex—it is also considered significant for its absence of mythical heroes, attention to female psychology, and depiction of everyday life—the level of eroticism in the book has been surprising even to modern day readers. On the occasion of the release of Roy’s translation, the New York Times wrote:

“When I taught it, my students were flabbergasted, even though they knew about the novel’s reputation,” said Patricia Sieber, a professor of Chinese literature at Ohio State University. “S-and-M, the use of unusual objects as sex toys, excessive use of aphrodisiacs, sex under all kinds of nefarious circumstances — you name it, it’s all there.”

The book’s pornographic reputation attracted a teenage Roy, but his translation, a three-decade project, reflects a lifelong fascination with Chinese literature and is celebrated today for its exhaustive research that includes 4,400 endnotes. Its publication in 2013 marked a major personal achievement for Roy and a historic publishing event for PUP. As for the book’s availability in modern China, Roy said:

Now the book is available, but it’s not always easy to obtain. Since Mao’s death there has been a flood of scholarship in Chinese on the Chin P’ing Mei; there is even a periodical on Chin P’ing Mei studies. I’ve drawn heavily on that material, but I’ve actually discovered quite a few sources that haven’t been identified yet by Chinese scholars.

You can read more about The Plum in the Golden Vase here, and more about the book’s illustrations on our design Tumblr.

A University of Chicago memorial service will be held for David Tod Roy in October.

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