Amy Binder: The Provocative Politics of the Republican Party

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by Amy Binder

Not so long ago, you might have been surprised to learn that conservative college students held events specifically designed to provoke, not illuminate, their liberal and moderate peers, faculty, and administrators. During Catch an Illegal Alien Day, students who pose as undocumented immigrants are imprisoned when caught by other students posing as border guards. At the Global Warming Beach Party, students mock the science of climate change with suntan oil and beer. At Affirmative Action Bake Sales, conservative student organizers charge white customers more for their cookies and cupcakes than they do black or Latino students—a fitting analogy, according to event organizers, of the harms visited upon white students by affirmative action policies.

But organize these events conservative students did, with the financial assistance and play-by-play handbooks produced by the Young America’s Foundation, a well-funded conservative organization that supports right-leaning students. The “provocative style” of these events that I and my co-author Kate Wood wrote about in our PUP book Becoming Right: How Campuses Shape Young Conservatives is not meant to reach out to liberals and moderates or to persuade them of conservative positions on immigration, environmental degradation, or race. Rather, the style is meant to enrage liberals on their campus, prod them into aggresively confronting event organizers, and then accuse the liberals who have been inflamed of being biased and intolerant toward them. We found that the provocative style is much less likely to take hold on campuses where there is a palpable sense of closeness and community (such as at a private elite university) and much more likely to be used at larger institutions where students are more anonymous to one another and their professors.

While you might have been surprised to learn about this campus style in years past, the only surprising thing about the provocative style today is that eight years ago it was students who were engaging in it, not the Republican party’s rank and file and torch bearers. In the time since we collected our data, this coarsening style has come to dominate the GOP. Shortly after the election of Barack Obama, members of the Tea Party ridiculed the president as a jungle bunny, witch doctor, and Muslim Marxist. In 2013, Congressional Republicans shut down the government trying to defund the president’s Affordable Care Act and, in 2016, most Senate Republicans refuse to even meet with Obama’s nominee for the Supreme Court.

This year’s election cycle is the apotheosis of provocation. Donald Trump calls Mexican immigrants “rapists,” Syrian refugees “terrorists,” and has successfully drawn his opponents into slugfests about everything from penis size to the attractiveness of their wives. Even while Mitt Romney, the Koch brothers, and other establishment leaders and funders bemoan the fallen state of their party, voters turn out in droves to hear Trump rail on his opponents and their “stupid,” “loser” policies. Today, we are witnessing the ability of the provocative style—sometimes merely obstructionist, sometimes purely aggressive—to drown out deliberative policy discourse. This has been happening for years—not just this election season, as the Romneys of the world would have us believe—and it begs us to see what lessons we can learn from college campuses.

First, we can see that style, not substance, is mainly what is at issue here. In this primary season, unprecedented provocation is driving huge numbers of die-hard Trump supporters to back him no matter what he says, substantively. They love how he says what he says, not what he says which, after all, can change from speech to speech. Many observers have also noted that when you strip away variances in style, the stated policy differences between Trump and his Republican detractors are not so vast—such as on abortion, climate change, and immigration. But Trump’s voters prefer Trump’s style over Cruz’s and the other competitors who have since left the race. All of this is to say that we have under-estimated the power of style vs. substance in politics for far too long. We saw this on college campuses 8 years ago.

Second, it’s important to think about the links between college-age politics and the way people will participate in electoral and institutional politics later in life. I don’t have the longitudinal data to make causal claims about the students we interviewed in our book, but if campuses are incubators for political action, as our study shows, university leaders would do well to minimize provocation today to save politics tomorrow. Creating organizational structures that help students feel connected to the campus, and part of a community, would be a smart move, no matter how large the institution. If colleges and universities can create campus cultures that attempt to strengthen a sense of civic community among students, faculty, and administrators; and which foster a tolerance for ideological pluralism, then perhaps we have at least one means for crafting a more respectful national political discourse in the future.

becoming right jacket binderAmy J. Binder is professor of sociology at the University of California, San Diego. She is the author of Contentious Curricula: Afrocentrism and Creationism in American Public Schools (Princeton). She is also the author of Becoming Right: How Campuses Shape Young Conservatives.

What do We Really Want in a President?

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by George C. Edwards III

It is only natural that citizens focus on the traits of candidates during a presidential election. After all, why do we hold an election if it does not matter who wins? One answer is that candidates support different policies. Presidents must do more than aspire to prosperity and peace, however. They also have to govern.

It is safe to stipulate that everyone wants the president to be honest, intelligent, strong, empathetic, and balanced. Most candidates claim to possess such traits, and, in truth, many of them do. What about political skills and knowledge, traits necessary for governing effectively? These dimensions of candidates receive much less attention than, say, integrity, but they are essential for successful leadership. Just what are the essential leadership traits and skills?

Understanding the Potential of Leadership

Successful leadership is not the result of the dominant chief executives of political folklore who reshape the contours of the political landscape, altering their strategic positions to pave the way for change. The evidence is clear that presidents rarely, if ever, mobilize the public behind their policies in order to pressure Congress to pass their initiatives. Nor do they convince many members of the legislature to switch from opposition to support of White House proposals.

Rather than creating the conditions for important shifts in public policy, effective leaders are facilitators who work at the margins of coalition building to recognize and exploit opportunities in their environments. When the various streams of political resources converge to create opportunities for major change, presidents can be critical facilitators in engendering significant alterations in public policy.

It follows that recognizing and exploiting opportunities for change—rather than creating opportunities through persuasion—are essential presidential leadership skills. To succeed, presidents have to have the analytical insight necessary to identify opportunities for change in their environments carefully and orchestrate existing and potential support skillfully. Successful leadership also requires that the president have the energy, perseverance, adaptability, and resiliency to take full advantage of opportunities that arise.

Knowledge and Temperament

We hear from some quarters that presidents do not require a mastery of the details of public policy. All they need is able and knowledgeable advisors. Although every chief executive certainly relies on such aides, expert advisors are not sufficient to produce quality decisions.

Presidents need to possess detailed knowledge of the issues with which they will deal. They require information about both public problems and policies, including tangible details, to construct a necessary frame of reference for decision making. How else can they effectively evaluate options and ask probing questions? How else can they sensibly choose among options?

It also matters whether the president has correctly identified a problem. If you think the Chinese are manipulating their currency to the detriment of American jobs, you may ask your advisors to formulate a policy to combat it. If you are wrong in your understanding of the Beijing’s actions, however, you will implement policy destined to fail. The devil is in the details.

In addition, presidents cannot assume that any person or advisory system will provide them with the options and information they require, and thus they must be actively involved in the decision-making process, setting the tone for other participants, maintaining the integrity of the advisory system, and reaching out widely for options and information.

President George W. Bush often described himself as an instinctual decision maker, a view shared by other close observers. Many of Bush’s predecessors shared his orientation to making decisions. A drawback to relying on instincts is acting impulsively rather than delving deeply into a range of possible options. Gut reactions also discourage investing time in soliciting and cultivating the views of others and asking probing questions of advisers.

Worldviews

Presidents and their aides bring to office sets of beliefs about politics, policy, human nature, and social causality—in other words, beliefs about how and why the world works as it does. These beliefs provide a frame of reference for evaluating policy options, for filtering information and giving it meaning, and for establishing potential boundaries of action. Beliefs also help busy officials cope with complex decisions to which they can devote limited time, and they predispose people to act in certain directions. Although sets of beliefs are inevitable and help to simplify the world, they can be dysfunctional as well.

There is a psychological bias toward continuity that results from the physiology of human cognitive processes that are reinforced from thinking a certain way and are difficult to reorganize. As a result, there is an unconscious tendency to see what we expect to see, which may distort our analytical handling of evidence and produces what is called a confirmation bias.

The George W. Bush administration operated on several basic premises regarding the aftermath of the war in Iraq: (1) Iraqis would greet Americans as liberators; (2) the Iraqi infrastructure would be in serviceable condition; (3) the army would remain in whole units capable of being used for reconstruction; (4) the police were trustworthy and professional and thus capable of securing the country;, and (5) there would be a smooth transition to creating a democratic nation. Each of these premises was faulty, but the administration made no systematic evaluation of them before the war and was slow to challenge them, even in the wake of widespread violence.

At other times, worldviews may encourage policy makers to assume problems rather than subject their premises to rigorous analysis. Because after 9/11 the Bush White House was highly risk adverse and because it was certain that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and was a threat to the United States, the administration never organized a systematic internal debate within the administration on the fundamental questions of whether Iraq actually possessed WMD, whether the Iraqi threat was imminent, whether it was necessary to overthrow Saddam and, if so, the likely consequences of such an action. Instead, it focused on the question of how to invade successfully.

It is not surprising, then, that the weakness of the data on Iraq never called into question the quality of basic assumptions. Intelligent, hard-working, and patriotic public officials who wished to protect American saw what they expected to see. We are still paying the price for their faulty analysis.

Policy preferences aside, it matters whom we elect as president. The winner’s understanding of the potential of leadership, skills to recognize and exploit opportunities, policy knowledge and temperament, and worldviews will strongly influence the good the nation will enjoy or the harm it will suffer during his or her tenure.

George C. Edwards III is University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University. His many books include Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency and The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership (both Princeton). His most recent book is Predicting the Presidency: The Potential of Persuasive Leadership.

What do sharks have to do with democracy? Christopher Achen & Larry Bartels explain

democracy for realists achen jacketAre modern ideas of American democracy fundamentally misguided? Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government by Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels examines the faults of current democratic logic that have led the majority of people to make misinformed opinions about politics.  As Achen and Bartels note, “politics is often not very cheery. But facing our problems honestly is the first step toward doing something about them.” In this spirit, the authors have taken time to explain their reasons for writing this book, what conventional ideas about democracy they oppose, the presidential primaries, and even shark attacks.

Why did the two of you write this book?

CA & LB: Working at different universities in the late 1990s, we discovered that we had come to quite similar intuitions about how American democracy works. Those intuitions were very different from what most people think, including most of our political scientist friends. We decided to write a book together. But turning those preliminary, unconventional thoughts into a serious argument backed by detailed evidence took more than a decade.

What are the conventional American ideas about democracy that you oppose?

CA & LB: Fundamentally, we Americans have abandoned the ideas of the Founders as expressed in the Federalist Papers, and we have substituted notions derived ultimately from the French Enlightenment. We think of ourselves as thoughtful, informed, rational, fundamentally decent people. We imagine that the problems of government are due to bad politicians and corrupt institutions. Thus most of us believe that, to the extent possible, government should be turned over to all of us as citizens, with as little role for governmental institutions and elected officials as possible. We think of that as “democracy,” and we believe that the more democracy, the better.

The problem is that a mountain of social science evidence has accumulated about our human capacities to run the government solely from the voting booth. That evidence shows that people are just people, with all the limited horizons, prejudices, and mistakes that characterize all of us as human beings. The judgments of the voters are an important part of democracy, but they cannot be the only part. Just as the various branches of government require balancing by the others, so also the judgments of voters need to be balanced by other societal and governmental institutions, including parties and elected officials. To think otherwise is to delude and flatter ourselves with an inflated view of our capacities, as the Founders understood.

We heard that there is something about shark attacks in this book. What do sharks have to do with democracy?

CA & LB: Many thoughtful scholars believe that a democratic election is primarily a referendum on the performance of the incumbents. If the people in office have performed well, the voters re-elect them. If not, the voters throw the bums out. That sounds good until one realizes that the voters have to know whether the incumbents really are bums. If things have gone badly lately, is that the government’s fault? Can the voters sort out credit and blame?

This is where the sharks enter our book. In the summer of 1916, New Jersey was plagued by a series of shark attacks along its Atlantic shore. Four people died. Just as in the “Jaws” movies, which were based on the New Jersey events, people stayed away from the beach in droves, and the Jersey Shore economy was devastated. Woodrow Wilson was running for re-election that summer. He and his administration did everything they could to solve the problem, but then as now, no one could control sharks. The attacks were no one’s fault, but the voters bit back anyway. In the Shore towns, Wilson’s vote in November dropped precipitously.

The irrational voting due to the sharks is not a special case. We also show that the voters blame the incumbents when it rains too much or too little. We estimate, for example, that Al Gore lost seven states in 2000 because they were too dry or too wet—more than enough to cost him the presidency. In these cases and in many other ways, the voters are often overwhelmed by the challenges of casting a well-informed, sensible vote.

In light of those ideas, how are you thinking about the presidential primaries this year?

CA & LB: We finished our book well before this year’s primaries began. We feel that every primary season illustrates the problems and the political forces that we have identified, although this year may furnish particularly clear examples. Our central argument is that people primarily vote their social, religious, and political identities, not their ideas or their policy preferences. The identities create the preferences, not the other way around. Voters typically know a candidate only from television and the Internet, and they look for a politician who reinforces and validates their own group loyalties. Particularly when economic times are hard, those identities can become quite antagonistic.

As a result, neophytes, demagogues, and extremists often do well in primaries. The people in politics who know them personally, and who know how unsuitable they are to be president, are cut out of the process, or have only a limited role, perhaps as convention super-delegates. The result is many foolish, even dangerous choices. We Americans think that this way of hurting ourselves is “more democratic.” But again, the authors of the U.S. constitution knew better.

That certainly doesn’t sound very cheery. Why should we read this book?

CA & LB: Politics is often not very cheery. But facing our problems honestly is the first step toward doing something about them.

As one important example, the way we pick presidents now is worrisome. It’s been worrisome, even scary, for several decades now, and yet we have drifted along pretending that all is well. It’s like skipping inoculations and then finding yourself, too late, in an epidemic. The usual ways of thinking about democracy have brought us to this point, and most of the reform proposals we have seen miss the fundamental issues and will make little or no difference. In our view, we need to rethink in a much deeper way. That is what this book is about.

Christopher H. Achen is the Roger Williams Straus Professor of Social Sciences and professor of politics at Princeton University. His books include The European Union Decides. Larry M. Bartels holds the May Werthan Shayne Chair of Public Policy and Social Science at Vanderbilt University. His books include Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton). Their most recent book together is Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government.

McGovern scholar Thomas Knock on classic presidential reads

election blog banner logoThomas Knock is the author of The Rise of a Prairie Statesman: The Life and Times of George McGovern, the first volume of the first major biography of the 1972 presidential candidate and eloquent critic of the Vietnam War. Called “the standard bearer of all future biographies” by the San Francisco Chronicle, Knock’s reconsideration of the politician is a perfect pick for election season. Recently we asked Knock what classic books on presidents we would find in his own library.

By Thomas Knock

I’m happy to recommend five books about major presidents and the politics of their times— from the early 20th century to the early 21st century—all classics in their field and favorites of mine. My list of personal favorites encompasses several historically great presidents or otherwise quite notable ones—Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton— who still have something to say to us today.

1.  John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest, Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Harvard, 1983).  This is a dual biography of two progressive presidents—one a Republican, one a Democrat—and the two most literate chief executives of the 20th century.  Together TR and Wilson recreated the modern presidency and, in their respective programs (the New Nationalism and the New Freedom) they laid the foundations for Big Government as we have come to know it today.  Cooper has definite and persuasive reveries about who is the Warrior and who is the Priest.

2.  Robert McElvaine, The Great Depression and the New Deal (Times Books, 1993).  A sweeping account of the crisis of the 1930s that gives both Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt their due and even stresses a significant element of continuity between the policies of the two antagonists.  In this, while providing a most lucid interpretation of New Deal politics and culture, one also can see a parallel between Hoover and FDR, on the one hand, and George W. Bush and Barack Obama, on the other, as the latter pair struggled to contain the gathering disaster of 2008-09.

3.  Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and his America (St. Martin’s, 1976, 1991).  This remains one of the two or three best, and most moving, books ever written about Lyndon Johnson, who I myself would describe as half a great president.  Perhaps the most important thing to take away from this work are the implications of a single remark of Johnson’s to Goodwin:  that he believed when he entered office that he had only 18 months or so to get done whatever it was he was going to accomplish.  And that—the concept of the 18-Month Presidency, so to speak—is something that too many presidents have never grasped.

4.  Sidney Blumenthal, Pledging Allegiance, The Last Campaign of the Cold War (Harper/Collins, 1990).  This study offers a trove of insights into American politics at the end of the Cold War.  Its most significant achievement is to establish Reagan and Gorbachev as an irreducible team–that the advent of each was fundamental to the other’s well being if either was to have the salutary legacy that they are both credited with today.  Along with the entire cast of candidates in the 1988 knock-down, the volume also addresses the matter of the presidential sex scandal, something new in the politics of the ensuing post-Cold War era, which fatally ensnared the formidable Gary Hart, a former McGovern protege.

5.  David Maraniss, First in His Class, A biography of Bill Clinton (Simon and Schuster, 1995).  An essential work about the first post-Cold War president, this biography also includes substantial instructive coverage of the early life of Hillary Rodham.  The thrust is the striving of the first Boomer to enter the White House, who left Arkansas to be schooled at Georgetown, Oxford, and Yale Law; lived the politics of the Sixties and Vietnam and earnestly embraced McGovern’s campaign (learning chastening lessons along the way); and then returned to Arkansas as his means to power.  From a 2016 perspective, one can fully appreciate his enormous capacities while apprehending the bridge the two Clintons constitute between past, present and future.

KnockThomas J. Knock is Altshuler Distinguished Teaching Professor at Southern Methodist University. He is the author of the prize-winning To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order and the coauthor of The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century (both Princeton). He lives in Dallas, Texas.

David Kennedy on remaking our technocratic world

KennedyIn today’s world, expert opinion is particularly revered in political and economic life. But as experts engage one another on a terrain of irresolvable argument, a world of astonishing injustice and inequality is born.  David Kennedy’s new book, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape the Global Political Economy draws on his personal experience working with international lawyers, human rights advocates, and an array of humanitarian strategists. The book reveals the power struggle occurring between those who have a stranglehold on the knowledge and those who don’t, arguing that expertise can be used to promote justice rather than inequality. Recently, Kennedy agreed to answer a few questions about his book.

Why a world of “struggle?”

DK: In this book, I try to reframe the international situation less as order or system than as a continual struggle, hence the title, A World of Struggle. When speaking about international affairs, the social sciences often start with conflict – a Hobbesian state of nature or the competitive market of Adam Smith – and then work to explain how things nevertheless turn out well ordered: through a “balance of power” or “invisible hand.” In my picture, thousands of conflicts undertaken by all sorts of people at once generate the world we live in, including terribly unjust things it seems impossible to change. Struggle and conflict are more prevalent and constitutive of our everyday world than we realize.

You write about knowledge and expertise – aren’t economic and military power more important in global struggle?

DK: It’s true, I am particularly interested in the role of ideas. I do think they’re more important than we realize. Although we think of international affairs as an arena of raw power, a great deal is argument and assertion. People drop bombs to “send messages” and transform economic power into a better deal through negotiation. In the shadow of coercion more often than through force.

People in places like Davos or Washington tell lots of stories about the world: stories about what an economy is, what politics can accomplish, about the limits and potential of law. Their stories make some problems visible, some actors central – and others invisible. The technical work people undertake as they struggle in the shadow of these stories arranges the world, distributing wealth, status and opportunity. In the book, I examine big ideas about things like economic development, international law or world trade to understand how they frame and fuel everyday battles for advantage among businessmen, bureaucrats, politicians and citizens.

Are experts too important in world affairs? Lots of people criticize the European Union, for example, as “technocratic” and decry the “democracy deficit.”

DK: Our world is a technocratic one. Experts have lots of authority and it is difficult to change things without speaking their language. And, as we all know, technocratic language is as prone to irrationality, confusion and conflicting objectives as any other. But “expertise” is not the exclusive province of specialists and professionals. All of us, from politicians, to entrepreneurs, to activists speak some vulgate version of languages once owned more exclusively by “experts.” As a result, it is not so clear there is a “political” or “democratic” alternative once democracy and rulership have themselves become technocratic practices.

To me, the problem is not experts run rampant, displacing more appropriate political, ethical or commercial ways of thinking. The problem is all of us – our human capacity for responsible decision and political engagement has been dulled. Or perhaps, like professional talking heads, we’ve all embraced the reassuring comfort of thinking we “know,” rather than face the anxiety of having to choose.

How does your work fit into the literature about “expertise?”

DK: Other studies of “expertise” focus on what makes expert knowledge distinctive. I focus on the continuities between their work and that of many others. Expert knowledge is human knowledge: a blend of conscious, semiconscious and wholly unconscious ideas, full of tensions and contradictions, inhabited by people who thing, speak and act strategically. If you think “expertise” is distinct from politics, you will worry about keeping experts and political leaders in their respective places. At the global level, this constitutional concern is less pressing because there is no constituted political alternative. It really is expertise all the way down. As a result, I worry less about the proper boundaries for expert knowledge and focus instead on the how of expert rule: the modes of public reasoning that arise where practices of power and the articulation of ideas intersect.

What about law? How important is law in world affairs?

DK: Very. People struggle over legal arrangements because they matter. The domain outside the nation is neither an anarchic political space nor a domain of market freedom immune from regulation. The basic elements of global economic and political life – capital, labor, credit, money and liquidity, as well as sovereignty and right – are creatures of law which could be put together in lots of ways. We forget how strange it is that if you own something here, you also own it when you get off the plane elsewhere. Yet, as businessmen and military leaders well know, our international world is the product of intense and ongoing projects of regulation and institutional management. A global production chain is a complex set of legal arrangements, cross-cut by all kinds of formal and informal norms, public and private regulation. Small changes in the rules can shift who wins and who loses.

Law is often at struggle because it distributes: allocating and protecting gains from economic activity or political conflict. Law is also a tool of struggle: I claim a legal privilege to put you out of business; you claim the legal authority to prevent me from combining with rivals to do so. I claim the right to overfly your territory or protect your minorities – or you claim the right to shoot down my plane and attack my humanitarian convoy.

Although we think of law as a source of order – the “legal order” – or as a vocabulary for criticizing government – as with human rights — I focus on the distributive role of law and the resulting push and pull about what it means and how it should operate.

Law does seem to be everywhere today – what has fueled its expansion?

DK: The ubiquity of law owes less to lawyers than to the appetite all kinds of people have for a common and malleable language of engagement. As law has become ever more diverse or plural, it has also become more prevalent. Law’s malleability both encourages people to assert their interests as legal rights – even when their interests are opposed – and opens numerous paths for settlement. The legal vocabulary today is widely available for both ethnical assertion and strategic pragmatism. In this, modern law is typical of many sophisticated expert practices: those who use it do so with a strange blend of confidence and disenchantment. Unfortunately, in the process, people can lose their ethical moorings: that, I believe, is the triumph and tragedy of global rule by expertise.

You offer “modern law and modern war” as an example of the contemporary powers and tragic consequences of expertise. What’s different now?

DK: Warfare has become ever more entangled with law as law has lost its distinctive clarity. Law now shapes the institutional, logistical and physical landscape of war and the battlespace has become as legally saturated as the rest of modern life. At the same time, law has become more malleable, the doctrinal materials used to distinguish war and peace or legal and illegal state violence ever more fluid. No longer a matter of clear rules and sharp distinctions, international law speaks with many voices. As it has become a more plastic medium, law has enabled a strategic management of war’s boundaries – when war ends, when it starts, what damage is collateral and what not. It now offers everyone a vocabulary for marking legitimate power and justifiable death. People everywhere can find reason to affirm their cause and decry the perfidy of their opponent.

When things go well, modern law can provide a framework for talking across cultures about the justice and efficacy of wartime violence. More often, the modern partnership of war and law leaves all parties feeling their cause is just and no one feeling responsible for the deaths and suffering of war. Law and war have become oddly reciprocal, communicating and killing along the boundaries of the world system, at once drenched in the certainty of ethics and detached from the responsibility of politics.

You end on an optimistic note – that people could pull back the dysfunctions of expert rule.

DK: I certainly hope they might. It would require inhabiting our expertise in a new way, less as pragmatic and sophisticated strategic actors than as people for whom, as Max Weber once wrote, politics is a vocation: with passion, with proportion and with responsibility in an irrational world that cannot be known or predicted. My proposal is not an escape from expertise or institutional recipe for its better use. It is a habit of mind, a personal and professional practice, to harness a long tradition of heterodox intellectual and political work to change the world. And to cultivate the ethical possibility of acting when we realize we do not know.

David Kennedy is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Global Law and Policy at Harvard Law School. He is the author of The Rights of Spring: A Memoir of Innocence Abroad; Of War and Law; and The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism, and the editor of The Canon of American Legal Thought (with William Fisher) (all Princeton). His most recent book is A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape the Global Political Economy.

Can Kasich Accentuate the Positive?

by Lynn Vavreck

Lynn Vavreck’s forthcoming book is a followup to The Gamble, the real-time election book she published with John Sides in 2012. Their current project, written along with Michael Tesler, is a data-driven, real-time analysis of the 2016 presidential election that will show how data and political science research reveals what matters (and what doesn’t) in the campaign for the White House.

Amidst a nominating contest filled with bluster and ad-hominem attacks, John Kasich is presenting himself as something different. His campaign has a notably positive tone and although Mr. Kasich trails his opponents in the delegate count, he continues to campaign mainly on empowerment and experience—and there’s some evidence that people like it.

Mr. Kasich’s campaign has run fewer television ads than his opponents, but his ads have proven compelling to analysts. Writing about Mr. Kasich’s first television spot, Philip Rucker of The Washington Post described the ad as having “arresting images,” “moody shots,” and a narrator with a “gravelly voice.” The music in the ad is equally interesting—part blues and part rock with a dash of grunge. It lends an authenticity to the ad’s message: John Kasich lived a “hard-scrabble life in a rusty steel town” and now he’ll take that grit to Washington and “never give up.”

But is this ad attractive to voters? Do they engage with its positive message? If Mr. Kasich blankets the airwaves in the upcoming days can he gain traction?

To answer this question I combined analytic tools provided by G2 Analytics, SageEngage, and YouGov with support from Vanderbilt University and UCLA to convene a virtual focus group. In this project, roughly 1,000 people were divided into four groups to watch and react to two political ads in real time. Some participants saw one of Mr. Kasich’s ads, others saw one of Donald Trump’s first ads. If viewers liked what was playing on their screen they could respond by clicking a bell and if they disliked it they could click a buzzer. They could do this as many times as they wanted in either direction. People were also asked some questions about the ads after they played. The participants are representative of the U.S. population and were divided equally and randomly into four groups of roughly 250 each: the first saw no campaign ads, the second saw only Mr. Kasich’s ad, the third saw only Mr. Trump’s ad, and the fourth group saw both campaign ads.

During both 30-second spots, viewers registered both positive and negative ratings. On average, the moment people liked best in Mr. Kasich’s ad was near the end, when the voice-over says, “They say our best days are behind us,” as these words appear on the screen and are also read aloud with punch: “America, Never. Give. Up.” This reference to a halcyon past is as close as Mr. Kasich gets in this ad to attacking Mr. Trump, whose slogan, “Make America Great Again” implies a return to a past far better than the present. In Mr. Kasich’s ad, viewers liked this rallying cry for American hopefulness best of all. His positive message moved people who saw this ad.

The part of Mr. Trump’s ad that people liked was near the middle when black and white images of military engagement are shown and the voice-over says, “He’ll quickly cut the head off ISIS and take their oil.” The Trump ad also talks about a “temporary shutdown of Muslim’s entering the United States,” and building a wall on our Southern border that “Mexico will pay for.” Although the ad isn’t attacking any Republican candidates directly, it begins with images of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton to clarify Mr. Trump’s positions from “the politicians” with whom he disagrees. His no-nonsense language moved people who saw this ad.

Overall, 42 percent of viewers who saw only the Trump ad rated it both as unfair and negative in tone. Only eight percent of the Kasich-only viewers felt the same about the ad they watched. Nearly half the Trump viewers thought the ad was untruthful relative to 16 percent of the Kasich viewers. Emotionally, 70 percent of the people who saw only Mr. Trump’s ad said it made them feel angry while only 22 percent of the people who saw only Mr. Kasich’s ad felt this way. Similarly, 74 percent of the Trump viewers felt worried after seeing the ad; only 37 percent of the Kasich viewers were left worried.

Viewers were also asked about how happy or hopeful the ads made them feel. Mr. Kasich’s ad left viewers a bit more of each, but only by a margin in the single digits. In terms of overall memorability of the ad, Mr. Trump’s ad wins—63 percent said they thought the ad was memorable compared to only 39 percent for Mr. Kasich’s ad. Both ads increased support for their sponsor in a hypothetical general election contest against Hillary Clinton by a few points (Mr. Kasich’s gave him a bigger boost).

Mr. Kasich’s ad left people somewhat happier and hopeful—and didn’t worry or anger them as much as Mr. Trump’s. They rated Mr. Kasich’s ad 10-points above the “average political ad” in overall quality while placing Mr. Trump’s ad 5-points below the average ad.

In the end, however, viewers thought Mr. Trump’s relatively negative, unfair, and untrue ad (according to their own ratings) was more memorable. This was true even for viewers who saw and rated both ads together, but memorable may not be the same thing as effective. On average, people rated Mr. Kasich’s ad as making them happy and hopeful—and as being higher in overall quality—and there’s some evidence to suggest that despite saying Mr. Trump’s ad was more memorable, Mr. Kasich’s empowering message moved people: among people who saw both ads relative to those who saw no ads at all, people increased their favorable ratings of Mr. Kasich by 11 points; Mr. Trump’s favorability, however, only increased by 3 points.

The Supreme Court and the battle for the U.S. Senate

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by Wendy Schiller       

“I hope they are fair.” (President Barack Obama March 16, 2016)

With the death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Election 2016 just got much more complicated. The GOP majority leadership in the Senate has threatened not to hold any hearings or votes on Merrick Garland, the Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, who was nominated to fill that vacancy by President Obama on March 16, 2016. They argue that it is too close to a presidential election, and a new president, to consider the nomination and that it should wait until after the new president is elected. Playing politics with Supreme Court nominees is not necessarily new for the U.S. Senate – Democrats and Republicans alike have done so in the past. However, it is nearly unprecedented to consider leaving a seat vacant on the Supreme Court for what will likely be more than a year. And the electoral landscape for the GOP in the U.S. Senate is extremely challenging because the GOP is defending 24 currently held Senate seats, while the Democrats are only defending 10 currently held Senate seats. That means many more Republican Senators will be forced to explain why they refuse to grant even a hearing to the President’s Supreme Court nominee in a year when voters already believe that the Congress – indeed the federal government more generally – is broken.

Amidst that electoral landscape, the chess match between Senate Republicans and the Democratic President gets more complicated because the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee is Charles Grassley, who is a Republican from Iowa up for reelection in 2016. Until recently it was unclear that a strong challenger would emerge to take on Grassley, who was first elected to the Senate in 1980. But just last week, Patty Judge, who has served as lieutenant governor of Iowa and its state agriculture secretary, announced that she will seek the Democratic nomination to run against Grassley. There are already three other candidates who have announced their intention to run against Grassley, but Patty Judge is widely thought to be the strongest candidate in terms of statewide appeal. Additionally, Hillary Clinton won the Iowa caucuses and is expected to be competitive in that state if she is the Democratic presidential nominee; it is possible that Grassley could face mobilized opposition from women in his home state on at least two fronts.

Merrick Garland served as a private practice attorney, a federal prosecutor who was part of the investigation into the Oklahoma City bombing, and was nominated by President Clinton to the D.C. Circuit of Appeals in 1997 and confirmed in a majority GOP controlled Senate. In fact, he was confirmed by a supermajority of Democratic and Republicans in the Senate, including seven Republicans who are still in the Senate today: Dan Coats (Ind.), Thad Cochran (Miss.), Susan Collins (Maine), Orrin Hatch (Utah), James M. Inhofe (Okla.), John McCain (Ariz.), and Pat Roberts (Kan.). However, Senator Grassley voted against him which means he is on record as opposing him well before this Supreme Court nomination emerged. Grassley maintains, along with the Republican leadership in the Senate, that their refusal to even consider Obama’s nominee has nothing to do with the person but rather the process.

Still, the ripple effect of the pressures on Charles Grassley to hold hearings on Merrick Garland is significant. For now, other GOP senators who are considered vulnerable in 2016, including Kelly Ayotte (NH), Ron Johnson (WI), Richard Burr (NC), Patrick Toomey (PA), and John McCain (AZ), are holding firm against considering any Obama Supreme Court nominee. But some of these senators are potentially facing very strong challengers: current Governor Maggie Hassan in NH, former U.S. Senator Russ Feingold in WI (whom Johnson defeated in 2010), former female State House Representative Deborah Ross in NC; former Congressman Joe Sestak in PA (whom Toomey defeated in 2010), and in Arizona, McCain is facing a potential challenge from Ann Kirkpatrick, a sitting Democratic Congresswoman. These challengers will make the Supreme Court nomination, and the process itself, a campaign issue against these incumbent Republican Senators. The more the landscape looks inviting to mount serious challenges to GOP senators, the greater the Democratic Party’s mobilization effort will be in terms of fundraising and campaign messaging. If Grassley is forced to consider holding hearings in the Senate Judiciary Committee to preserve or strengthen his own reelection chances, the other members of his party running for reelection in 2016 might begin to feel similar pressures. The takeaway for Election 2016 is that the Supreme Court nomination battle may not just be a fight about controlling the direction of the Court, but also about partisan control of the U.S. Senate itself.

electing the senate schiller jacketWendy J. Schiller is associate professor of political science and public policy at Brown University. Her most recent book is Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy before the Seventeenth Amendment.

Where are the Women Architects? An interview with Despina Stratigakos

StratigakosWomen have been entering universities excited to major in architecture. But studies have shown that although women currently make up 40% of all architecture majors at colleges across the United States, only 17% of architectural professionals are female.  Despina Stratigakos takes a close look at this disparity in her new book Where are the Women Architects?. Recently Stratigakos answered some questions on her book, and what she calls the disturbingly high dropout rates for women in the profession.

Why do we need to talk about women in architecture? Can’t we just focus on the work of architects, regardless of their gender?

DS: It’s easy to say that gender issues are a thing of the past, but a young woman entering architecture today still confronts an unequal playing field. She can expect to make less than her male peers at every stage of her career, to see fewer career-building opportunities come her way, and to struggle to make it to the top ranks of the profession, which remain overwhelmingly male. Discrimination lies behind these hurdles and is the reason we continue to see such disturbingly high dropout rates for women. So, yes, we do have to talk about women in architecture. And hopefully do more than just talk.

But aren’t more women than ever studying architecture? Won’t that influx resolve these issues as more women integrate into the profession?

DS: Numbers alone aren’t a fix. For the last fifteen years, women have been a strong presence in architecture schools, making up nearly half of the student body. But far too many of them eventually leave architecture. As a result, the number of women in practice has flatlined, with women today representing less than one in five licensed practitioners. Beyond the human tragedy of so many women abandoning their dreams, this loss of talent and energy undermines the health of the profession.

Why do so many women leave architecture?

DS: This phenomenon has been so little studied, that’s it hard to give conclusive answers, but new research suggests that women leave for complex and varied reasons, including salary gaps, fewer opportunities for career advancement, a lack of mentoring and role models, and routine sexism in the workplace. The simplistic explanation, trotted out for decades, that women leave practice to have babies doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. It’s true that architecture’s deadline-driven culture makes it difficult to balance raising a family with the expected long work hours. But not all mothers choose to leave architecture, and women without children are also struggling in the profession, so the issue can’t be reduced to biology.

In your book, you point out that journalists and other observers have been asking about architecture’s missing women for over a century. If this phenomenon isn’t new, why write the book now?

DS: Something new is afoot in architecture. While there have been questions and protests about the lack of women in architecture for a long time, gender equity issues today are attracting attention across a broader span of the profession and are also garnering public support. A new generation of advocates are speaking out about issues of diversity in architecture and organizing at a grassroots’ level to make their voices heard. I identify this as architecture’s third wave of feminism, and hope the book helps to define a movement that may, at last, bring about deep change.

Architect Barbie’s inclusion in this book may come as a surprise to some readers. You write candidly about your reasons for partnering with Mattel to create the doll and the responses, some of them critical, she received when launched in 2011. Why did you decide to include her story in this book?

DS: I am very interested in how popular culture shapes professional images and the role gender plays in such ideals. For an earlier generation, Howard Roark, the protagonist of Ayn Rand’s hugely influential novel, The Fountainhead, embodied the ideal image of the architect—especially as portrayed by Gary Cooper in the 1949 film version. Barbie is a cultural icon who is both loved and hated, and casting her in the role of an architect galvanized people into talking about professional stereotypes, such as whether architects can wear pink. Her story is relevant to the challenges that women architects face in the real world, especially because she lets us look at gender issues from unexpected angles.

The ideal image of the architect also comes up in your chapter on architecture prizes as a boys’ club. You write about how Zaha Hadid, after becoming the first woman to win the prestigious Pritzker Architecture Prize in 2004, endured humiliating press stories that focused on her appearance rather than on her achievements. Some of these accounts are quite shocking to read today. What do you want readers to take away from this account?

DS: This rather shameful moment in architectural journalism speaks to the discrimination that even the most successful women architects face. Denise Scott Brown’s exclusion from the 1991 Pritzker Architecture Prize awarded to her partner Robert Venturi, which I also discuss, is another instance of how even prominent female practitioners can be dismissed. But 2004 is not that long ago, and the sexist reaction to Hadid’s win reminds us that attitudes about women being lesser architects and unworthy of the highest laurels are not part of a long-dead past.

But has that changed now? This year, the AIA Gold Medal is being awarded jointly to Denise Scott Brown and Robert Venturi, and Zaha Hadid has won the Royal Institute of British Architects’ Royal Gold Medal, the first woman to be offered the honor in her own right. Are women architects finally getting their due?

DS: These awards are highly deserved and long overdue, but have come about only after sustained pressure on professional organizations to better align their rewards systems with today’s architectural realities. Scott Brown is the first living woman to win the AIA Gold Medal ever; Hadid is the first sole female practitioner to win the RIBA Gold Medal ever. These are important milestones, but we don’t yet know whether they are part of a larger pattern. In the book, I discuss how the paucity of female laureates has led to the recent and rapid proliferation of new prizes solely for women architects. Time will tell whether such women-only honors continue to multiply or whether they will come to seem anachronistic.

In the book, you also express concern about a more mundane vehicle for recognition: inclusion in Wikipedia. You write about the invisibility of women architects on this hugely popular and influential website, and the bias of male editors against entries on women’s history. Why is it important to close that visibility gap?

DS: In the last twenty years, histories of women in architecture have flourished and have come to challenge our understanding of the people and forces that have shaped our built environment. But for these discoveries to reach a broad audience and to become widely known, they need to appear in the places where people look today for information on the past, and that is increasingly to free online resources such as Wikipedia. Content on Wikipedia is controlled by its editors, who are overwhelmingly male and resistant to the inclusion of women’s histories. This absence threatens to perpetuate the belief among a younger generation that women architects have made no meaningful contributions to the profession. I explore the campaigns launched by tech-savvy activists to write women architects into Wikipedia.

Despina Stratigakos is associate professor and interim chair of architecture at the University at Buffalo, State University of New York. She is the author of Hitler at Home and A Woman’s Berlin: Building the Modern City. Her most recent book is Where are the Women Architects?

A Single Issue Candidate?

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by Jason Stanley

On February 11th, in the democratic debate between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in Milwaukee, Clinton introduced a new criticism of Sanders that has since become one of her campaign’s central themes. Sanders is a single issue candidate, focusing on the problems caused by Wall Street, big financial interests, insurance companies and other wealthy and powerful business interests to the exclusion of other, equally important and structurally central issues.

There are, refreshingly, legitimate philosophical disagreements at issue in the democratic primary. However, I will present strong reasons to reject Clinton’s position. The Sanders’s campaign addresses significant issues that speak to a large, diverse, and important number of social and political ills, made worse by the lack of significant campaign finance reform. Most importantly, Clinton’s campaign strategy and arguments for it give us reason to suspect that they are problematically influenced in a way that strengthens, rather than minimizes, Sanders’s concerns.

Bernie Sanders could not be more explicit about his central political concern. It is wealth and income inequality. On his website, it is the first issue listed. It is described as “the great moral issue of our time…the great economic issue of our time, and…the great political issue of our time.” His view about how to tackle the problem is also clear. We must “take on the enormous economic and political power of the billionaire class.” This is a stark contrast with Hillary Clinton. In a recent article, Thomas Frank writes, “income inequality has little role in the grand sweep of her political career.”

Clinton introduced the charge that Sanders is a “single issue candidate” in Milwaukee:

Yes, does Wall Street and big financial interests, along with drug companies, insurance companies, big oil, all of it, have too much influence? You’re right. But if we were to stop that tomorrow, we would still have the indifference, the negligence that we saw in Flint. We would still have racism holding people back. We would still have sexism preventing women from getting equal pay. We would still have LGBT people who get married on Saturday and get fired on Monday. And we would still have governors like Scott Walker and others trying to rip out the heart of the middle class by making it impossible to organize and stand up for better wages and working conditions.

Clinton here blames the crisis in Flint on “negligence”, which is a failure of individual responsibility (presumably, the governor’s). The “racism holding people back” has nothing to do with “Wall Street and big financial interests, along with drug companies, insurance companies.” These are notions of racism, sexism, and homophobia detached from oppressive economic structures.

One model of racism, sexism, and homophobia treats them as problematic attitudes that individuals have. Clinton attributes Governor Scott Walker’s assault on the labor movement to his lack of empathy, also a problematic individual attitude. I begin by responding to Clinton’s arguments, using this individualist interpretation of Clinton’s examples.

Clinton is fair to describe Sanders’s mission in terms of a battle against the excessive influence of “Wall Street and big financial interests, along with drug companies, insurance companies, big oil”. Clinton clearly thinks this is not serious enough to be the basis of a presidential campaign. Her campaign strategy is to minimize the problems these institutions pose to our social and political system.

Many of us agree that racism, sexism, homophobia, Flint, and Scott Walker are serious problems. Clinton presents them as clearly outside the scope of Sanders’s single issue, the “excessive influence” of the billionaire class and the institutions they control. Instead, she attributes these problems to individual failings. Let’s take the problem of racism as a test case of this view. Is the problem of racism mainly or centrally a problem of individual racist attitudes? Or is racism substantially interrelated with the practices and institutions Sanders targets?

In “The Case for Reparations”, Ta-Nehisi Coates builds a case for reparations for Black Americans. One of his central examples of a historical racist harm reparations should address is the 20-1 wealth gap between white and Black Americans. Is the wealth gap mainly a problem of individual attitudes?

Coates argues that a central mechanism in the maintenance of the wealth gap is homeownership. At the heart of his analysis are the structural practices of mortgage lending at the intersection of government housing policy, banks, and other lending institutions. His argument for reparations culminates in an account of the predatory lending practices of financial institutions during the recent subprime mortgage crisis, which as have been well-documented, reinforced and increased the racial wealth gap. In short, he argues that in explaining a chief racial harm, the 20-1 wealth gap, one must appeal to the structural practices of the apparatus of mortgage lending, practices at the heart of the financial industry.

The practices of finance are mainly guided by the view that pure profit seeking is in the public good. The poor have no choice but to accept high interest rates. So when such practices are applied to a group that has been historically disenfranchised, their effect is to support and maintain that disenfranchisement. These are essential mechanisms in the support and maintenance of the racial wealth gap. After a certain point, the mechanism can even be self-sustaining. After all, even if everyone working in those institutions suddenly adopted antiracist views, practices that already target poor populations would not substantially change.

I have represented Clinton’s argument with the use of individualist notions of racism and sexism. But the argument cannot be saved by appeal instead to structural ones. There is no notion of structural racism that is entirely devoid of economic oppression of the sort Coates discusses (mutatis mutandis for the structural effects on race of the health industry and the energy industry). Similar points can be made about structural sexism.

Clinton has spoken movingly and incisively about structural sexism. But in this campaign, Clinton has repeatedly represented calls for significant structural reform as juvenile or pointless. This suggests an ideology that minimizes the effects of structural oppression. Clinton tends to propose policies that support the ideal of enhanced individual opportunity. The rhetoric of individual opportunity suggests a picture of social and political reality as consisting simply of array of individual citizens. It supports general enhancement of opportunities as a natural policy goal. But this is dangerous political illusion.

Suppose one group fails to benefit from a policy intended to benefit all. A picture of political reality that omits structural barriers to a group will leave its members as the only visible source of fault for policy failures. When a policy fails because of the structural barriers the group faces, its failure will instead be attributed to character flaws of members of that group. A correct picture of social and political reality must include not just individuals but also the significant structural barriers between them.

Sanders’s agenda in running for President is to reform institutions and practices responsible for the maintenance of structural barriers between groups, with the structural barriers erected by wealth and income inequality as his focus. He emphasizes “the billionaire class”, by which he means those who control and direct streams of capital, out of suspicion that their practices bear outsized responsibility for maintaining unjust social and economic distinctions. The individuals and institutions provide mechanisms through which historical structural injustices become self-reinforcing. I have used Coates’s explanation of how mortgage and lending practices are mechanisms in the maintenance of the racial wealth gap to illustrate Sanders’s point. In our society, much structural injustice runs through the mechanisms that control flows of money. They are far from the only mechanisms supporting the diversity of kinds of structural injustice, but given our economic system, they are the ones that have the widest application.

Why did Hillary Clinton choose the general campaign of minimizing concern for the causes of wealth inequality? Why not instead coopt the Sanders agenda, combining it with her indisputable policy expertise, experience, and brilliance? This would show respect for Sanders’s concerns, while making a powerful case that she is the best candidate to address them. It’s implausible to attribute this campaign strategy to a decision about electoral strategy; indeed her campaign strategy has widely been taken as the cause of Sanders’s shocking upset in Michigan. As a short-term plan, her campaign strategy was unwise. This has not been addressed in recent discussions. It requires explanation.

Two examples Clinton prominently used of real problems that would not be addressed by Sanders’s concerns and reforms are crucial to discuss in explaining her choice of campaign strategy. These are the examples of Scott Walker’s policies, and the disaster in Flint, Michigan. Her choice of these two examples is concerning. On closer inspection, it supports Sanders’s views about the moral and political threat posed by “the billionaire class”.

Is the cause of Scott Walker’s anti-labor policies lack of empathy? Or is it rather that he is, in the words of a prominent national politician, just getting “his marching orders from the Koch brothers”? The Koch brothers are the nation’s premier financial supporters of politicians whose policies reinforce structural barriers due to wealth inequality. Their relationship to Scott Walker is one of the most salient examples of the “enormous economic and political power of the billionaire class”. And Hillary Clinton is undeniably aware of the duplicity involved in using this example; after all she is the “prominent national politician” quoted at the start of this paragraph.

Far more worrying, however, is Clinton’s use of the water disaster in Flint, Michigan as a problem that would be left completely unaddressed by Sanders’s “single issue” reformist agenda. Clinton attributes the cause of the crisis to a failure of individual responsibility. This is an egregious misrepresentation. There are two central causes of what occurred in Flint. One cause is Michigan’s Emergency Manager laws, which were used to replace democratically elected mayors with “emergency managers” who were then in complete control of financial decisions. Racism played a significant role here, as claims of emergency seemed to suspiciously correlate with majority Black cities. These “emergency managers” then made undemocratic decisions, which seemed to serve the “billionaire class” at the center of Sanders’s concerns, rather than the citizenry.

The second central cause of the disaster in Flint is the swap contract the banks engineered with Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD). DWSD had to pay $537 million simply for a swap contract termination fee. DWSD was forced to raise its fees drastically. Since Detroit sits on the world’s largest body of fresh water, it is quite obviously not because of a resource poor situation. It is because of a swap contract that was, to say the least, ethically deeply troubling.

The first nationally reported effect of these deeply problematic financial industry contracts was the widespread water terminations in Detroit. It was predictable then that there would be additional victims of the combination of undemocratically appointed “emergency managers” with financial industry practices of offering absurd swap contracts to “protect” municipalities and public utilities from drastically rising interest rates that never arrived. The general consensus is that the EM’s decision to switch Flint’s water source away from DWSD was to avoid high rates for water paid by customers of DWSD. If so, the cause of the Flint emergency is the disastrous swap contract that the banks negotiated with DWSD, i.e. a direct result of bank practices that Sanders’s campaign targets.

In recent weeks, newly uncovered emails have suggested an alternative motivation for the switch from DWSD to the Flint River. According to the Detroit Metro Times, the emails suggest the motivation for the switch was instead [Governor Rick] “Snyder’s desire to privatize and break up DWSD or maybe Snyder’s goal of opening up fracking opportunities around the new KWA pipeline.” After all, removing Flint, an important source of revenue for DWSD, obviously adds to the financial woes caused by its deal with the banks, and strengthens the claim to sell it into private hands.

This too squarely places the blame on the agendas of the “billionaire class”. DWSD is a public utility with access to the world’s greatest supply of fresh water, the Great Lakes. There are many wealthy and powerful interests who would wish to own such a unique resource and use it for profit, and its debt is used in the argument to privatize it. The entire story about Flint is one about the “billionaire class” jockeying for money and power; the only question is which exact interests are the cause. None of it involves “negligence”. Quite the contrary, it involves careful strategic planning.

Why has Clinton’s campaign strategy taken the form of minimizing the problem of wealth inequality? To deepen the mystery, why use examples that underscore the importance of the issues at the heart of Sanders’s campaign, in an effort to minimize them? What follows, of necessity, involves speculation about motivations.

The water crisis in Flint has attracted international attention. A shady financial industry deal with a public water utility is generally agreed be its cause (a point oddly absent from the national press narrative). The situation raises serious concerns for the financial industry. Flint is an obvious example to use to build public pressure for a general reformist agenda that would address the problem of shady municipal loans. Perhaps the whole practice of such contracts with public utilities and municipalities might be drastically reformed, well beyond what already has occurred in Dodd-Frank.

The second concern is that Flint could be employed to extract a record settlement as well as lawsuits against the banks (conservative estimates of costs of repairing the water system start at 1.5 billion). JP Morgan Chase offered a swap contract to the public water and sewer utility in Jefferson County, Alabama, which almost led to the country’s largest municipal bankruptcy. The SEC leveled a 722 million dollar fine against JP Morgan Chase for overcharging on swaps. The state of Michigan is Jefferson County writ large.

As Wallace Turbeville documents in an important 2013 piece in Demos, the “risky financial deals” Wall Street sold to Detroit in 2005 and 2006 play a large role in its financial problems. DWSD’s rate hike due to a problematic swap contract led to the water crisis in Detroit last year. The water crisis in Flint is also directly connected to the debts DWSD incurred from this Wall Street contract (even the argument for privatizing DWSD is based on its thus incurred debt). At some point, even the national media might recognize that there is a stream of problems in Michigan connected to water. It is but a short step to trace them to the public utility supplying it, and to recognize that its problems are due to an ethically dubious swap contract arranged by Wall Street. A good deal of the work of Snyder’s “emergency managers” has been to obscure and prevent such an outcome, by directing the blame elsewhere (e.g. pensions), and keep revenue streams flowing to the banks. But if the national media were somehow (miraculously) to draw the connections, there could be strong public pressure for settlements and lawsuits of historic proportions.

The above facts raise the possibility that Clinton disconnected the crisis in Flint from its actual causes in a highly prominent television moment as part of an agenda to protect the interests of Wall Street.

Hillary Clinton has received 2.9 million dollars in speaking fees from speeches to financial institutions between 2013 and 2015. She has many other connections, and is the recipient of much campaign support from them. These facts lead her to be less critical about these institutions and their practices, to minimize their harms, including the influence of their lobbying on politicians. And isn’t that exactly the problem Sanders’s reformist agenda seeks to address?

“The billionaire class” directs vast flows of cash at our politicians. We have seen strong evidence that is has influenced Clinton’s recent rhetorical strategy, whose purpose after all is to minimize concerns about the influence of “the billionaire class”. The very campaign strategy she has taken is in fact its own best self-refutation.

Stanley jacketJason Stanley is the Jacob Urowsky Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. Most recently, he is the author of How Propaganda Works. Read more on his website, here.

Q&A with Fawaz A. Gerges, author of ISIS: A History

Iisis gerges jacketSIS has become a notorious menace in today’s world, its name synonymous with ideologically motivated savagery. But what exactly explains the group’s spectacular rise and its unsettling recruiting success? In ISIS: A History, (April, 2016), Fawaz A. Gerges argues that ISIS is a manifestation of the breakdown of state institutions and intense foreign intervention. In contemplating its future trajectory, Gerges takes a look at the group’s weaknesses, including what he terms “extreme totalitarianism, even with its allies”, as well as the absence of “a social and economic blueprint”. Today, Gerges answered a few questions about why this written history is so important and what needs to be understood about ISIS.

What makes your book different from other recent books on ISIS?


FG: In the last two years a significant amount of books on ISIS have been published, and more are yet to be released. While most books do a great job at presenting ‘ basic’ facts about the organization and the chronology of its activities, with this book I want to produce an approachable analysis of ISIS’ mission, ideology, struggle and strategy. The book highlights some important features and aspects of ISIS history that have received at best limited coverage in the other available works.

In a way, ISIS: A History is an extension of my two previous books on the global jihadist movement: Why Jihad Went Global [Cambridge University Press, 2005] and The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda (Oxford University Press, 2011), in that it contextualizes the organization, its growth and evolution within the global jihadist movement. My aim is for the reader to understand how ISIS emerged out of the complexities of militant jihadist politics and to explain the ideological framework within which the organization operates and how it consolidates and expands its influence near and far. I also provide an important analysis of the relationship(s) between the “Arab Spring” uprisings and the rise of ISIS, which in my opinion, is an aspect that has too often been neglected and side-lined.

What’s the most important thing you want your readers to understand about ISIS?

FG: I would want the reader to understand that the spectacular surge of ISIS should be understood on one level, as the symptom of a severe, organic crisis of Arab governance and on another level, as a manifestation of decades of developmental failure in the Arab world and the social and economic pauperization of Arab societies. Moreover, ISIS is in part a product of intense and persistent foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries.

Among the important arguments and conclusions presented in this book is the recognition of diversity among radical religious activists: global jihadists are not a monolith and their internal conflicts and power struggles are significant in shaping their actions. Similarly, it is shown that while these groups are embedded in local, regional and global context, in the case of ISIS, the local dimension of the movement is pivotal.

What do you think would most surprise your readers to learn about ISIS?

FG: While the world is captivated by ISIS’ brutality and institution of a modern sex trade, less is known about the group’s capacity to govern, how it is digging in, and embedding itself deeper into the fabric of life in war-torn Iraq and Syria. By increasingly acting like a pseudo-state, ISIS makes the inhabitants dependent on its services, planting the idea in their minds that they are in control. In zones torn out by war, insecurity and abject poverty, ISIS has increasingly co-opted local communities under its control by filling a governance void and providing public services and good salaries. According to local residents in Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, Mosul, Fallujah, and other cities, ISIS has set up rudimentary bureaucracy and administration and functioning institutions; it improved security and law and order, if harsh, and provided jobs in decimated economies. Residents report that ISIS delivers important services, such as bakeries, policing, a swift sharia-based justice system, identity cards and birth certificates, consumer watch, garbage collection, dare-care centres, clean and well-run hospitals, and procured teachers to work in its schools, even though the quality of these services is neither stellar nor free.

As a result, ISIS is both welcomed and feared by Sunni communities who have lived through decades of repression, tyranny, corruption and violence.

What is the most understood aspect of ISIS?


FG: The most understood aspect of ISIS is its brutality. The group is synonymous with savagery, which the group is itself openly advocating. From the videoed beheadings of hostages and dissidents to the ethnic cleansing of minorities, ISIS makes a point of disclosing its goal to cleanse Sunni society of other cultural influences. In Iraq, it clearly aims at dismantling the diverse social fabric made up of Sunnis, Shia, Kurds, Yazidis, and Christians. A case point illustrating ISIS’ ethnic cleansing is its extraordinary punishment against the Yazidis, in the summer 2014, after its capture of Mosul.

How does your explanation of the rise of ISIS differ from that of others?


FG: As I mentioned earlier, while jihadist groups are embedded in local, regional and global contexts, in the case of ISIS, its local dimensions are significant. Although ISIS is an extension of the global jihadist movement in its ideology and worldview, its social origins are rooted in a specific Iraqi context, and, to a lesser extent, the Syrian war that has raged since 2011. Its strategic use of sectarian clashes between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims within the Iraqi and Syrian contexts has greatly benefited the organisation and shaped its activities. In addition, like the Taliban, if ISIS retains control over territory and peoples and delivers public services, it would likely consolidate its hegemony and gain the inured consent of the governed. This makes ISS radically different from and more dangerous than Al Qaeda Central, which never controlled territory and people or had immediate designs to create a state of its own. In contrast, ISIS is building a rump state in both countries and offers a subversive vision that dates back to seventh century Arabia. By doing so, it threatens the foundation of the Middle Eastern state system in a fundamental way than no other non-state actor has done before.

What are the most important differences between ISIS and Al-Qaeda?

FG: What sets ISIS apart from other non-state actors, including Al Qaeda Central, is possession of material capability, will power, and ideological capital, which it combined to deadly effects. ISIS controls a wide swathe of territory in Iraq and Syria that contains a population estimated at over 5 million people. In addition it controls a sectarian army numbering more than 30,000 fighters. In contrast during the height of its power in the late 1990s, Al Qaeda Central possessed fewer than 3,000 fighters with no territories of its own. Moreover, while Al Qaeda’ s Osama bin Laden was under the protection of Mullah Omar, the late Taliban leader in Afghanistan, by anointing himself supreme ruler of Muslims worldwide, ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi directly challenged Omar’s claim to the same title. ISIS’ blatant challenge of the Al Qaeda leadership and its imperial ambitions show an organisation determined to impose its will as a new major player in the region and a de facto State as well.

There is also an important ideological distinction between the two organisations. Al Qaeda emerged from an alliance between ultraconservative Saudi Salafism, or Wahhabism, and radical Egyptian Islamism, known as Salafi-jihadism. In contrast, ISIS was born of a marriage between an Iraq-based AQI (Salafi-jihadism) and an identity frame of politics. The ISIS ideological lineage of Salafi-jihadism, a union between Saudi Wahhabism and revolutionary Egyptian Islamism, forms part of the ideological impetus, the other part of its ideological nature is a hyper Sunni identity driven by intrinsic and even genocidal anti-Shia ideology.

Is ISIS more or less dangerous to the West than Al-Qaeda? Why?


FG: From a Western perspective, ISIS’ swift conquests in the Arab heartland, which is strategically and economically significant, constitutes a serious security dilemma facing pro-Western Arab regimes. Western governments also fear the potential spill-over effects of the expansion of ISIS’ power on their own national security in the long term. More than 20,000 foreign fighters from more than 90 countries have travelled to Syria and at least 3,400 of them come from Western countries. The fact that the number of foreign fighters continues to increase is particularly alarming and reflects a phenomenon that deserves critical scrutiny. European and American leaders are also anxious that the foreign fighters radicalized and militarized in Iraq and Syria could return home and carry out terrorist attacks. The Charlie Hebdo attack in France on 7 January 2015 did little to qualm such fears.

Do you think ISIS is a longterm threat?


FG: Yes I do. ISIS’ umbilical cord is tied to the raging sectarian fires in Iraq and Syria and the clash of identities that is ravaging Arab countries. If those problems are not dealt with, even if ISIS is defeated, there is always the risk of another like-minded militant group, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, the official arm of Al Qaeda Central, filling a power vacuum in the region. If as I argue ISIS is a manifestation of the breakdown of state institutions, then the fragile authoritarian state system must be rebuilt on a more solid, legitimate foundation. What we need is for governments in the region to be transparent, inclusive and representative of their population. They need to deliver public goods, including jobs, and give millions of young men and women a stake in the future of their countries. A more complex challenge is also to confront ISIS’ ideology and worldview. Following the repression or, in the case of Iraq and Syria, the abortion of the Arab Spring uprisings, a lot of people feel that peaceful demonstrations had failed to provide them with the justice, freedom and dignity they had called for. As a result we now need to (re)-convince them that there are nonviolent options that can bring about meaningful and substantive political change. Until we do, the menace of the “Islamic State” will remain a problem both for the Arab-Islamic world and for the international community.

Has ISIS gone global?


FG: Although ISIS attracts recruits from various countries, as of now, it remains more interested in the ‘near enemy’ than ‘the far enemy’. Clearly, ISIS has placed the struggle against the Americans, Europe and even Israel as a distant secondary goal that must be deferred until liberation at home is achieved. One needs to recall that at the height of the Israeli assault on Gaza during the summer of 2014, after being criticised by militants for failing to intervene, ISIS insisted that its main struggle was the one it wages against the Shias. ISIS is more interested in building a Sunni “Islamic state” in the heart of Arabia and consolidating its grip on the Iraqi and Syrian territories in which it occupies than marching on Rome or Washington. In his second address to the world, Baghdadi explained that ISIS’ grand ambition is to expand in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The group has also managed to obtain pledges of allegiance from factions who had been part of Al Qaeda in Egypt, Libya, Somalia, and Nigeria. ISIS has even made inroads in Yemen, home to Al Qaeda’s strongest affiliate (AQAP), in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip and is also beginning to challenge the Taliban in Afghanistan and several prominent figures among the Al Qaeda-linked Pakistani Taliban factions have pledged allegiance to Baghdadi.

What do you think is most likely to happen with ISIS in the near 
future? In the long term?


FG: The menace of the “Islamic State” needs to be taken seriously. As “Islamic State” militants swept across Syria and Iraq, they destroyed, damaged and looted numerous cultural sites and sculptures, condemning them as idolatry. For an authentic Islamic state to be erected, the Sunni militants of ISIS feel that the Islamic lands must be cleansed of apostasy and heretics regardless of the human or civilizational costs. In fact, ISIS’ planners are keen on displaying ideological zeal and purity to outbid rival Islamists and show that they are the sole defender of the faith and the (Sunni) umma.

For example, in an attempt to cleanse Sunni society of other cultural influences, ISIS has sought to dismantle the diverse social fabric made up of Sunnis, Shia, Kurds, Yazidis, Druze, and Christians that have developed and persevered from the ancient civilization of Mesopotamia, today’s Iraq.

A case point illustrating ISIS’ ethnic cleansing is its extraordinary punishment against the Yazidis, a tiny religious minority who represent less than 1.5 percent of Iraq’s estimated population of 34 million and whom ISIS considers heretics. After the capture of Mosul and its outlaying towns in summer 2014, including Sinjar, near the Syrian border, home to tens of thousands of Yazidis, ISIS engaged in systemic cultural cleansing, forcing hundreds of thousands of minorities from their homes, and using sexual violence as a weapon by indiscriminately raping Yazidi girls and women. ISIS viciously attacked the Yazidis, killing men and boys of fighting age and abducting a total of 5,270 Yazidi girls and women (at least 3,144 are still being held at the time of writing), which were subsequently forced into sexual slavery, according to human rights organisations, United Nations figures and community leaders. To handle the modern sex trade, ISIS has developed a detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery, including sales contracts notarized by its Islamic courts. And systemic rape has become an established and an increasingly powerful recruiting tool for ISIS to lure men from deeply conservative Muslim societies, where casual sex is taboo and dating is forbidden.

One of the weaknesses of ISIS is its extreme totalitarianism, even with its allies, as well as lack of a social and economic blueprint. The schism between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, the official arm of Al Qaeda Central, in Syria shows that its strategy to impose itself as the absolute jihadist movement does not always work out in its favour. Instead, it can lead to internal splits and turn former allies into enemies. ISIS has mastered the art of making enemies of the entire world, including potential allies, and top militant clerics and theorists. Although for now ISIS is ascendant, its long term prospects are grim. Once ISIS’ military fortunes decline it would face a reckoning. Under ISIS, there is no breathing space for social mobilization and political organization, including like-minded Salafi-jihadi activism. ISIS possesses a totalitarian, millenarian worldview that eschews political pluralism, competition and diversity of thought. Baghdadi and his associates criminalize and excommunicate free thought and the idea of the “other” is alien to their messianic ideology. Any Muslim or co- jihadist who doesn’t accept ISIS’ interpretation of the Islamic doctrine are apostates who deserve death.

Fawaz A. Gerges is author of ISIS: A History. He is professor of international relations and Emirates Professor in Contemporary Middle East Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His many books include The New Middle East, Obama and the Middle East, and The Far Enemy. His writing has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Guardian, Foreign Affairs, and other publications.

James Axtell on writing a “genealogy” of the modern American research university

wisdom's workshop axtellPope Gregory IX described universities of the middle ages as “wisdom’s special workshop”, but today’s American universities bear only a passing resemblance to the European institutions that founded their most basic principles. In In his newest book, Wisdom’s Workshop: The Rise of the Modern UniversityJames Axtell writes an 800-year evolution of the modern research university, outlining the trials and successes that occurred while these universities were taking root in America. He recently took time to explain why this examination of higher education is so necessary.

You’re probably best known as the author of eight books on colonial Indian-white relations or “ethnohistory.” How and why did you make the transition to the history of higher education?

JA: I didn’t shift to higher education but back to it. I began my scholarly career in the history of education with a study of one-time Oxford don John Locke’s educational writings, followed by a book on education at all levels in colonial New England, including Harvard and Yale. Then, partly as a result of the “Red Power” protests of the late ‘60s, I was drawn to the ethnohistory of Indian-white relations in colonial North America. After 20-plus years probing the ins and outs of those relations, I was drawn back to the history of higher education. After finishing most of a book of essays on The Pleasures of Academe: A Celebration and Defense of Higher Education (1998), I spent a dozen years researching and writing Princeton’s history from Woodrow Wilson’s transformative presidency (1902-10) to 2005. Retirement from William & Mary in 2008 took me to Princeton for a semester of teaching and the organization of a conference on “The Educational Legacy of Woodrow Wilson,” which resulted in an edited book in 2012. When Peter Dougherty, the director of Princeton University Press, suggested the genealogy of the modern American research university as a much-needed book, I immediately saw it as a perfect fit for my longtime experience and love of universities.

Do you see that shift in interests as a sharp break?

JA: Not as much as it must seem to others, because I chose to write the history of Princeton as the first ethnohistory of a collegiate university. From my study of Indians and colonists I brought a focus on cultures and en- and ac-culturation as the best way to understand the transition of an educational institution from a relatively small, hidebound college to a world-class research university. So I devoted substantial chapters to the century-long development of the faculty, admissions, curriculum, student life and extracurriculum, library, art museum, graduate school, and university press–all the participants in and agencies of education.

Wisdom’s Workshop similarly focuses on the educational process (teachers, students, courses, and books), but with slightly more attention to institutional foundings, leadership, and architecture. It also covers a much longer time-span in tracing a clear and specific genetic lineage from medieval foundings and Tudor-early-Stuart Oxbridge, to 9 colonial American colleges, innumerable academies and c. 250 colleges before postbellum university developments and, in the 20th c., what Clark Kerr called “multiversities.”

Are the sources for university history much different from those for colonial ethnohistory? Are the questions?

JA: While some of the questions were framed similarly, the sources were of course quite different. I didn’t use archaeology, linguistics, or oral memory as much, but I did pay close attention to material culture, student jargons and dress, and faculty, administrator, and student memoirs. As centers of manuscript and then print culture, colleges and universities were founded on and sustained by the intellectual activities and written products of learned classes, who have left myriad clues to their pasts in libraries and archives around the world. The 19th-century invention and spread of photography has given university history an important additional source, which I have used in numerous illustrations in the Princeton and present histories.

You have written an 800-year “genealogy” of the modern American research university. What surprised you about what you found?

JA: A whole lot of things, some major, some interestingly “factoidal.” First, three persistent myths. I found no evidence to support the notion that Harvard was modeled after Emmanuel College, Cambridge. The second myth was that antebellum student mayhem was caused largely by a static college curriculum and a dull “recitation” system of teaching: the curriculum was prescribed but not static, and recitations were used almost exclusively in introductory courses to ground students in the basics. The third myth posited that American higher education was transformed after the Civil War by the wholesale importation of German academic features by returning American graduate students and scholars: instead, borrowings were carefully selected and adapted to American needs and conditions.

I was happily surprised to find that some medieval matriculants could not write; hazing of freshmen (“yellow-beaks” or “goats”) began in the Middle Ages; student spies (lupi or “wolves”) reported classmates who didn’t speak Latin outside of class as required; undergraduates were prohibited from using medieval libraries because they were places and “occasions for [presumably coeducational] sin;” four Tudor university chancellors were beheaded by King Henry VIII for not toeing the party line; 17th-c. Oxbridge students were forbidden (rather than recruited) to play football; parchment pages declared “heretical” were used as toilet paper, book bindings, and soap wraps; 17th-c. Harvard graduated an average of only 8 B.A.s a year; Yale College moved location five times in its first 18 years; campus was coined by Princeton’s president in the 1770s and spread quickly; antebellum academies enrolled far more students (including women) than did colleges and offered curricula that often earned advanced college placement; in copying older eastern college architecture, newer western colleges often built dorms with long hallways, perfect for student conspiracies (or rebellious “sprees”) and cannon-ball bowling games; the libraries of student literary societies were often larger (and more up-to-date) than college libraries; the only 19th-c. German university degree was the Ph.D. and only a quarter of students bothered to take it: the majority studied for state professional exams; 19th-c. German (and postbellum American) Ph.D. dissertations were article- rather than book-length; American college rankings began as early as 1910; Harvard wisely rebuffed a philanthropist’s offer to build a Harvard dorm in the “Turkish style;” diplomas (as opposed to degrees) were not given regularly until the late 19th c.; older veterans admitted to American colleges on the G.I. Bill after WW II (many with wives and children) performed so well that younger students cursed them as DARs (“Damned Average Raisers”); research conducted on government contracts at U.S. universities during the war contributed mightily to Allied victories, as did the influx of Jewish scientists and scholars exiled from Axis countries (the “Rad Labs” at Harvard and MIT and the atomic HQ at Los Alamos, NM were key); the loss of a Class of 1907 son on the Titanic led eventually to the building of the world’s largest university library system at Harvard (despite which, a New York Times article in 2014 declared Harvard “The Stanford of the East”).

The modern American university comes in for a lot of criticism. How do the consistently high global rankings of America’s research universities jibe with those criticisms?

JA: The global rankings are based primarily on research productivity, patents, and commercialization, faculty “star” power (especially Nobel Prizes), and other quantitative measures such as library holdings, endowments, and operating budgets. Most of the criticism is aimed at undergraduate education and the very diverse public and private American (non-)system below the 50 or 100 elite research universities. The two measures are not inconsistent or incompatible. In trying to serve more than 20 million students, America’s institutions of higher education perform very well for many, less well or poorly for many more, often because of inadequate secondary preparation, economic inequalities, or family circumstances. There is plenty of room for improvement in the “system” as a whole, but Wisdom’s Workshop, focused on America’s best universities, seeks to explain why they continue to earn a majority of the top global rankings.

The university is a medieval European creation. Has it maintained its essential identity and focus through eight centuries of social and intellectual change? If so, how?

JA: According to former University of California chancellor Clark Kerr in 1982, it had done so. “The eternal themes of teaching, scholarship, and service, in one combination or another, continue.” “Universities still turn out essentially the same products–members of the more ancient professions…and scholarship.” “The faculties are substantially in control….” “Looked at from within, universities have changed enormously in the emphases on their several functions and in their guiding spirits, but looked at from without and comparatively, they are among the least changed of institutions,” not unlike the Roman Catholic Church, several monarchies, and a few parliaments, all of which they outnumber by large margins.

Thirty-four years later, much the same could be said. For wherever they are founded or maintained, they serve society in familiar ways. Their participants may be more diverse, their purviews broader, their resources more extensive, their tools more sophisticated, their administrations larger and more involved in their operations. But they are today still recognizable for what they do, how they look, and who and what they produce because they are conservative as well as progressive institutions at the very crossroads of modern society.

You obviously enjoy writing: what do you like the most? Did or do you have any models?

JA: As a teenage sports reporter for two local papers and school publications, I was fond of adjectives and adverbs. Now, besides utter clarity and factual accuracy, I seek the richest nouns and verbs, internal rhythms, and unconscious (but once recognized, stet-ed) wordplay. I never consciously patterned my writing after that of any models, though I’ve admired and still do admire many historians and writers (Tony Grafton, Jim Turner, John Elliott, David Quinn, George Kennan, Edmund Morgan, Bill Bowen, John Fleming, Peter Brown, Erwin Panofsky, Natalie Davis, Rolena Adorno, John McPhee, and Inga Clendinnen to name just a few) Instead, I relish and applaud their lifelong professionalism, productivity, and stylistic brio.

James Axtell is the Kenan Professor of Humanities Emeritus at the College of William and Mary. His many books include The Pleasures of Academe, The Educational Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, and The Making of Princeton University (Princeton). Axtell was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2004. His most recent book is Wisdom’s Workshop: The Rise of the Modern University.

Simon Reich: Does it matter who wins the election when it comes to the Middle East?

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Elections, the perennial wisdom tells us, are generally not decided by foreign policy issues.

But who’s to say that 2016 will not buck the trend, as it has in so many other ways?

We are potentially only one Paris-style terrorist attack or a brazenly aggressive act by Russian President Putin from changing the mood and focus of the American electorate.

Indeed, Republican voters already consider terrorism their primary concern. And the never-ending, slow drip release of Hillary Clinton’s Benghazi emails is certain to return the spotlight to foreign policy.

So let’s take a look at how the candidates stack up in the most contentious region in the world: the Middle East.

Whom to compare – and why

Let’s look at the three major Republicans left in the race.

Donald Trump has actually said very little about foreign policy, especially about the Middle East.

In fact there are essentially few discernible differences between Trump’s position on the region and those of his main rivals, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio.

While Trump says little, Cruz’s position is one-dimensional. He would rely on brute force. Cruz has said he wants to “carpet bomb” the Islamic militants and find out whether “sand can glow in the dark.” But there isn’t much beyond that. Still, it is more than Trump has offered which is to “behead” the Islamic State, or ISIS, and steal their oil.

Rubio’s position is the most fleshed-out, probably because he has the most foreign policy expertise and has spent time working on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee. Not surprisingly, therefore, he also offers the most comprehensive plan for dealing with ISIS, the central focus of his plans for the Middle East if elected.

Hillary Clinton, of course, has by far the most foreign policy experience of any candidate left in this year’s field – and arguably among the most of any in history.

First Lady, Secretary of State, the Clinton Foundation: she has a unique resume.

Two different world views

So how do Clinton and the Republicans compare when it comes to American policy the Middle East?

President Obama has often, I believe unfairly, been accused of having no grand strategy at all, let alone one for the region.

The consensus among American policymakers is that there are are four enduring interests for the U.S. in the Middle East: oil, regime change, terrorism and the protection of its allies (always Israel and, more variably, Saudi Arabia).

Then there are also always a series of proximate issues that dominate the press – like Iran’s nuclear program or ISIS’ conquests.

The differences between these candidates are which they prioritize, and how they approach them.

Clinton’s liberal internationalism

Clinton’s approach to strategy in most of these areas relies on what policymakers and academics generally label a liberal internationalist approach, one that employs what they call “smart power.”

This approach relies on a combination of tools – diplomatic, economic, military, political, technological and cultural – in the pursuit of foreign policy.

Secretary of State Clinton speaks on Middle East policy in 2010 Jose Luis Magaua/Reuters

Secretary of State Clinton speaks on Middle East policy in 2010
Jose Luis Magaua/Reuters

Clinton has explicitly written and talked about smart power. She used this approach in Libya in 2011 when the goal was regime change
and would employ the same cocktail: for example, to defeat terrorist groups like ISIS. But while she favors a no-fly zone to protect civilians in Syria, she eschews the idea of American forces entering a Middle Eastern ground war at this point.

So, right or wrong, she appears to have learned some lessons from the Iraq debacle and the shorter Libyan intervention.

All presidential candidates talk about the essential role the U.S. plays as a “leader.” But, when they use that word, they don’t always mean the same thing.

Generally, Clinton favors the kind of influential multilateral approach to leadership adopted by the Obama administration in the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. There it saw itself as a “first among equals”: that is, a member of a group who is officially on the same level as the other members but who has more responsibility or power.

In practice, that means that the U.S. sets the agenda and largely defines the approach to problem, even as it seeks and acts on the basis of consensus.

It also means that its policymakers anticipate the need to compromise. John Kerry epitomized that approach in the exhaustive negotiations with the Iranians.

The Republican primacist view of the world

The Republicans all rely on a very different set of principles in defining their general strategy.

It is one that policy wonks and academics label “primacist.” A primacist approach relies much more on military power than Clinton’s more balanced elixir when it comes to foreign policy.

Cruz, for example, simply wants to destroy what he calls “radical Islam” from the air through carpet-bombing.

Rubio’s view is more developed. His view of leadership entails a rhetorical reference to multilateral coalitions. But still, like Cruz or Trump, he has a far greater willingness to act unilaterally without regard to the concerns of organizations such as the United Nations.

Senator Rubio at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (with Senator John McCain in the background). Larry Downing/Reuters

Senator Rubio at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (with Senator John McCain in the background).
Larry Downing/Reuters

So it isn’t surprising that Rubio’s stump speech includes lots of references to rebuilding and modernizing the military in the face of what he characterizes as “devastating” recent defense cuts. Indeed, Trump has said it would be his first order of business if elected president.

Of course, America’s military power is unprecedented. And the danger of a primacist approach is that policy makers see the use of force as a first option rather than a last one in resolving every problem. Indeed, it recalls the adage that “when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”

Obama tried to construct a national security strategy that conserves American power. Clinton advocates much the same. But the Republicans’ philosophy is based on the belief that the aggressive use of American power will only make it more powerful.

So it isn’t surprising that Rubio’s plan to defeat ISIS includes a ground war. Or that all the Republicans are staunch advocates of intervention against countries like Iran and say they would tear up the agreement with the Iranians (and indeed roll back any agreement with Cuba if elected.)

Unlike Clinton, Rubio, for example, would aggressively support regime changes in both countries. The Republicans reject what Obama characterizes as “strategic patience” an approach that emphasizes the importance of awaiting changes to slowly unfold in both countries.

Similarities – yes, there are some

Nevertheless, there are some areas where Clinton and the Republicans would likely enforce similar policies.

These are areas where every president, including Obama, have been remarkably consistent. The U.S. Navy, for example, protects freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hormuz off Iran’s coast. Their goal is to ensure that world markets are not roiled by a sudden shortage of Middle Eastern oil caused by sabotage of tankers passing through this narrow waterway.

And they’d all maintain a close alliance relationship with Israel, although – based on their rhetoric – the Republicans would be exceptionally uncritical.

Clinton, for her part, has consistently supported Israel and has links to America’s Jewish community that can be traced back decades. But her support of the Iran deal has cast a doubt in the minds of some of Israel’s supporters as to her fidelity when it matters the most.

So what should we conclude?

At the end of the day, the policy differences between Clinton and the leading Republicans are occasionally stark. At other times, however, they are unclear.

If we are to believe what they say (which is always an issue in any election season), then the chances of America entering a new ground war in the Middle East will significantly increase under a Republican president. Their style would be more forceful as they rely more on American military power as an instrument of change.

Clinton’s style and tone would differ. Looking at the success of the Iran agreement, she might be tempted to rely more on multilateral diplomacy as a first option and force as a last – even if it means negotiating with people she doesn’t like.

Then again, despite her impressive resume, Clinton might feel that she has to demonstrate some resolve, as America’s first female president, to address any lingering doubts. And in the Middle East there is no way of knowing where that will lead.

One thing is certain: whoever becomes president, there is no way that America will relinquish its continued obsession with the region.The Conversation

Simon Reichgood-bye hegemony reich jacket, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers University NewarkHis most recent book is Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.