Sweeping and Colorful Account of Egypt’s 5000-Year History

With the recent discovery of an ancient statue of King Amenhotep III (grandfather of King Tutankhamun),  you may want to learn more about Egypt’s fascinating history.  We invite you to read chapter one of Robert L. Tignor’s new book, Egypt: A Short History.

This is a sweeping, colorful, and concise narrative history of Egypt from the beginning of human settlement in the Nile River valley 5000 years ago to the present day. Accessible, authoritative, and richly illustrated, this is an ideal introduction and guide to Egypt’s long, brilliant, and complex history for general readers, tourists, and anyone else who wants a better understanding of this vibrant and fascinating country, one that has played a central role in world history for millennia–and that continues to do so today.

Respected historian Robert Tignor, who has lived in Egypt at different times over the course of five decades, covers all the major eras of the country’s ancient, modern, and recent history.  This book provides an indispensable key to Egypt in all its layers–ancient and modern, Greek and Roman, and Christian and Islamic.

Read chapter one online:
Egypt: A Short History
By Robert L. Tignor
http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9274.html

Interview with Ziba Mir-Hosseini

Ziba Mir-Hosseini, well-known Islamic feminist and author of Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran, recently participated in a question-and-answer session with Yoginder Sikand. Here is an excerpt from the interview:

In recent years, a number of Muslim women’s groups have emerged across the world, struggling for gender equality and justice using Islamic arguments. Most of them are led by women who come from elitist or, at least middle class, backgrounds. Many of them seem to lack a strong popular base. How do you account for this?

Ziba Mir-Hosseini: I think the majority of the women who are writing and publishing about what is popularly called ‘Islamic feminism’ are definitely from the elite or the middle class… I believe that Islamic feminism is, in a sense, the unwanted child of ‘political Islam’. It was ‘political Islam’ that actually politicized the whole issue of gender and Muslim women’s rights. The slogan “back to the shariah” so forcefully pressed by advocates of political Islam in practice meant seeking to return to the classical texts on fiqh, or Muslim jurisprudence, and doing away with various laws advantageous to women that had no sanction in the Islamists’ literalist understanding of Islam.

Click here to read the rest of Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Yoginder Sikand’s conversation.

Guess who’s reading Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History?

If you guessed General Petraeus, you are correct! See this great short article from Reuters for more.

Thomas Barfield at Stockton College, 9/29/10

After travels all over the world, Tom Barfield is finally venturing to the state of New Jersey to give a lecture at Stockton College. Details below — hope you can make it.

“Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History”
Thomas Barfield

Date: Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Time: 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm
Location: Townsend Residential Life Center, Stockton College, Pomona, NJ

Thomas Barfield, author of Afghanistan, at The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, September 16

Thomas Barfield, author of Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History will give a lecture at The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University on September 16th. Details below.

Lecture: American Policy and Afghan Realities: Problems and Prospects

Date: Thursday, September 16, 2010

Time: 4:00–6:00 p.m.
Location: The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
1737 Cambridge Street
Bowie-Vernon Room (K-262)
Cambridge, MA

More information: Jointly sponsored by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University

For more information about this event, please contact Elizabeth Lawler at 617-495-3816 or elawler@wcfia.harvard.edu.

Information on upcoming sessions is available on our website:http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/middle_east/schedule

Afghanistan continued…

Just ran across a great review of Thomas Barfield’s Afghanistan in BusinessWorld (India).

Think about Afghanistan, and the first image that comes to mind is that of a failed, balkanised nation. And the Afghans, a people caught in constant tribal wars or with an invading power. And then comes a book that overturns all of this, making you think again.

Sounds like good reading to me. Check out the introduction to the book here: http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i9144.pdf

The Sherlock Holmes-Princeton University Press connection via the New York Times

On the At War blog at the New York Times, Stephen Farrell draws a connection between Dr. Watson of Sherlock Holmes fame and our out of print book Afghanistan by Louis Dupree.

The point of connection? The battle at Maiwand. In A Study in Scarlet, Dr. Watson describes his ordeal in traveling to Afghanistan and serving “at the fatal battle of Maiwand.” Farrell jumps from Dr. Watson’s words to Dupree’s recounting of the political aftermath of the battle–as the government changed hands, liberals moved to withdraw troops from Qandahar and support for the war wanes.

Click over to the NY Times site to read Farrell’s article, and while Dupree’s “encyclopedic” book (Farrell’s word not mine) is no longer available in print, you might be interested to read a more contemporary take from another PUP author. Check out this excerpt from Tom Barfield’s Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.

Even before coming to an agreement with Abdur Rahman, the British had recognized an independent wali (governor) of Qandahar in May 1880. Drawing on an obscure line of Sher Ali’s cousins, the British proclaimed his rule to be hereditary, provided him with arms, had coins minted, and had the khutba read in his name. In return, they would control Qandahar’s foreign relations and station political agents at court. But the stability of the new principality was challenged by Herat’s governor, Ayyub, who had moved his army (forty- five hundred infantry, thirty-two hundred cavalry, and four thousand irregular ghazis) east. In July 1880, the army encountered a strong body of twenty-eight hundred British troops supported by two thousand followers at Maiwand. Although the British had superior arms, the Afghans were able to close on their formation by taking large casualties and they annihilated the enemy in fierce combat. If Ayyub had immediately followed up on his victory, he could have easily captured Qandahar. Instead he delayed ten days before besieging the city, giving the British enough time to regroup and fortify their position. Yet even without occupying Qandahar, had Ayyub chosen to march north on Kabul, the country would have risen with him.

“If you want to figure out a way forward for Afghanistan, fake history is not the place to start.” Great advice from Christian Caryl in Foreign Policy

We couldn’t have said it better. Understanding the real history of Afghanistan is imperative to make sensible decisions about the war. Yet fake history abounds. Myths and stereotypes, skewed historical facts, and manipulated versions of historical events get in the way of plotting the best way forward. The time has come to truly educate ourselves on the history of Afghanistan. This is our best bet at securing a good outcome for the war. And nowhere will you find a more comprehensive and authoritative history of that troubled country than in Thomas Barfield’s Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.

Read Christian’s article here for a quick dose of real history, but make sure you check out Tom’s book for the complete story.

Here’s a quick summary of the key points in the article that are drawn from the book:

Fake History: Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires
Real History: This reputation isn’t borne out by the country’s long history.

“For most of its history Afghanistan has actually been the cradle of empires, not their grave,” writes Barfield.

Fake History: Afghanistan repelled powerful invading forces from England and the Soviet Union.
Real History: The history of these wars is much more nuanced.

Yes, it is true that the Afghans massacred all but 1 of 16,000 British troops in its initial invasion in the eighteenth century, but as Caryl notes, “Everyone tends to forget what happened after the rout of the British: In 1842 they invaded again, defeating every Afghan army sent out against them.”

As for the Soviet defeat, Caryl writes, “even the most skeptical historians concede that, around 1984 or so, the Soviets were actually getting the better of the mujahideen.” It was U.S. intervention and weapons that eventually allowed the Afghans to gain the upper hand.

Fake History: Afghans are untamable savages, incapable of being civilized.
Real History: While Afghans don’t conform to this misrepresentation, they may benefit from it.

This dangerous stereotype serves to mislead and dissuade foreign invaders. As Caryl notes, “Barfield contends that the Afghans have long understood the tendency of foreigners to view them as untamable savages and have been happy to leverage the stereotype to their advantage.”

Fake History: Afghanistan has always been at war.
Real History: If you focus only on the last 30 years of warfare, it is easy to underestimate the possibilities for Afghanistan’s future.The complete history of Afghanistan reveals a different story.

“Unfortunately, popular views of the place today are shaped by the past 30 years of seemingly unceasing warfare rather than substantive knowledge of the country’s history,” writes Caryl.

Fake History: Afghanistan is inherently unconquerable because of the “fierceness of its inhabitants and the formidable nature of its terrain.”
Real History: The reality is that “for 2,500 years it was always part of somebody’s empire, beginning with the Persian Empire in the fifth century B.C.” Afghanistan is winnable with the right strategy.

Fake History: As a tribal culture, Afghanistan has never known peace and never will.
Real History: There are long stretches in history where Afghanistan was peaceful in spite of tribal divisions and a fractured population.

PUP Exclusive: “Can the French legally ban the burqa?” by John R. Bowen

Can the French legally ban the burqa?

John R Bowen

author of Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves and Can Islam Be French?

France has just passed a law that its prestigious State Council said has no clear legal basis, that may soon be declared unconstitutional, and that would in any case be challenged before the European Court of Human Rights. The general ban on covering the face in public space will lead to fines and ‘education’ for Muslim women wearing what is called the burqa, the niqab or the ‘full veil.’ The measure easily passed the lower house on July 13th, and now goes to the Senate for the expected approval.

It is easy to ridicule the French law: why set the police out to track down the miniscule number of women wearing burqas, who tend to be French-born, not Afghan imports? Why not allow them their religious freedom? Does the law reflect anything more than general Islamophobia and calculated electioneering?

Well, certainly French politicians listened to polls showing strong support for the law, and voting for it may undercut support for the far-right National Front, so simple electoral politics might explain the vote. But politicians could have opted for a more narrowly-tailored ban, one limited to government offices and shops and that would have likely been judged constitutional. They argue that a broad law sends the right message, and that it is constitutional. They make three arguments for its legality, only one of these claims has a chance of being accepted—and it might seem the oddest of the three to those outside France.

The first argument is that the burqa stands for the oppression or the inequality of women. This claim is too abstract to be of legal use—what is it for an item of clothing to have an objective meaning? Moreover, no women are coming forward to complain about having to wear the garment in question. In the absence of a clear harm, the law must tread very lightly.

Others argue that wearing the burqa violates the dignity of the individual. Although the idea of individual dignity is held high in France, it is difficult to translate into law, particularly when it conflicts with individual rights. After a debate in the 1990s over whether “dwarf tossing” violated individual dignity—the State Council ruled that it did but was roundly criticized—France’s courts have given this notion a wide berth, except in the sphere of bioethics and human reproduction.

This leaves a third claim, that covering the face in public violates basic ideas of how French people should live together, and thus offends public moral order, or ordre public. Justice Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie based her argument for the law on this principle, saying that the law would protect French rules of living together, with people able to speak with each other “faces uncovered”.

Such a claim might make little sense in America, but French political ideas give the state a large role in creating a ‘community of citizens’. The state school system is supposed to create a sense of shared citizenship; marriage is supposed to take place only at city hall; the state retains a strong role in everyday life.

But what about individual rights? Does not the French Constitution, itself drawing on the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, protect religious beliefs? Indeed it does, but France considers religious practices to be protected only when they are part of religious requirements, as in the case of worship or eating appropriate foods. France routinely limits behavior that in the United States would enjoy First Amendment protections, such as distributing religious materials on the street or dressing in a religious way. And thus the government thinks that it might be able to successfully argue that because burqa-wearing is not required in Islam, and because it violates French ‘public moral order’, the ban does not unduly infringe on the liberty of its citizens.

The next months will see whether France’s Constitutional Council (and perhaps the European Court of Human Rights) sees things in the same way.

Thomas Barfield answers the question “Is Afghanistan ‘Medieval’?” at Foreign Policy

In an article over at Foreign Policy, Thomas Barfield posits that being Medieval (as Afghanistan has been accused in recent months by Britain’s new defense minister) might not be such a bad thing. As the article’s subtitle notes — “The religious and political struggles of that era can offer some useful lessons.”

In July 1973, Afghanistan’s King Mohammed Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin Daud, who then abolished the monarchy and declared himself the president of a republic. The New York Times sarcastically editorialized that Afghanistan had just “leaped into the sixteenth century.” Radio reports soon brought news of this slight even to provincial northern Afghanistan, where I was working at the time. Daud’s government in Kabul expressed its displeasure, but an Afghan friend familiar with the region’s complex history saw it differently. “We may have acted hastily,” he joked. “The 15th century was pretty good around here!” Indeed, the Timurid dynasty that had its capital in Herat during that period was internationally renowned for its fine arts, monumental architecture, classical poetry — and effective governance.

I was reminded of this story last month when the Afghan government accused Britain’s new defense minister, Liam Fox, of insulting Afghanistan by describing it as a “broken 13th-century country.”

Visit Foreign Policy’s site to read the complete article: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/02/is_afghanistan_medieval?page=0,0

You might also be interested in this excerpt from Barfield’s new history of Afghanistan: http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i9144.pdf

Former CIA officer and PUP author Emile Nakhleh on Muslim engagement and religious freedom over at the Immanent Frame blog

Check out this very enlightening blog post by our author and former CIA intelligence director Emile Nakhleh over at the terrific blog The Immanent Frame. There has been a debate at the blog focusing on whether to engage the Muslim world where religious freedom is a challenge to policy and diplomacy.

For more information, take a look at Emile’s recent PUP book A NECESSARY ENGAGEMENT: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World.

Thomas Barfield leads panel on establishing political legitimacy in Afghanistan

For a great event summary and to watch a video of Thomas Barfield’s panel at The Wilson Center last week, please visit their site.

The panel convened to discuss how political legitimacy can be established in Afghanistan. According to the event summary, Barfield identified key “half-truths” about Afghanistan that have mis-informed foreign policy in recent years:

  • One is that the country has never been conquered by outsiders. (Barfield clarifies that the entire country has not been conquered, but desirable regions, particularly urban centers, have not fared so well)
  • The second is that Afghanistan is “a land of unending insurgencies.” (Barfield asserts that Afghanistan had no insurgencies until the first Anglo-Afghan war)
  • The third is that Afghan rulers gain legitimacy through the approval of loya jirgas—large gatherings of political and tribal leaders and other important figures in Afghan society (Barfield noted that Afghanistan leaders traditionally don’t seek “the consent of the governed.” Instead he say leadership credentials are proven by “showing you’re a ruler, not by asking to be a ruler.”)

Watch the video and then grab a copy of Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History to learn more.