Archives for December 2017

Bird Fact Friday — the Slender-tailed Nightjar

Adapted from page 164 of Birds of Masai Mara:

The Slender-tailed Nightjar is an amazingly camouflaged nocturnal bird of open acacia areas. A good local guide may know where to find one roosting on the ground during the day. They become easier to see as they rise to hawk for insects at dusk and dawn, sometimes coming to feed on moths at the lights of lodges and camps, when it looks like a falcon or a large swift.

Do you spot the Slender-tailed Nightjar in the photo?

This is the most abundant of the nine species of nightjar resident in the Mara, and hence it is the one you are most likely to encounter when visiting the area. At night, listen out for its monotonous call which is similar to a car alarm “we-we-we-we-we…”; in flight, its call is a squeaky “wik-wik-ik”.

Birds of the Masai Mara
By Adam Scott Kennedy

Birds of the Masai Mara is a remarkably beautiful photographic guide featuring the bird species likely to be encountered by visitors to the popular Masai Mara National Reserve in Kenya. With an eye-catching layout, easy-to-use format, and no-jargon approach, the book contains more than 300 stunning photographs covering over 200 species of birds and is accessible and informative, rather than purely identification-based. A handy, brief introduction provides visitors with background on the habitats of the national park, and the guide’s habitat-based approach makes it simple to identify any bird species according to where it is found. Based on the firsthand experiences of the author, Birds of the Masai Mara is an ideal companion to all those visiting the national reserve and to bird aficionados interested in learning more about the region.

  • The only photographic guide to focus solely on the bird species of the Masai Mara National Reserve
  • More than 300 remarkable photographs covering over 200 species
  • Accessible text explores bird species behavior and species etymology
  • A brief and handy introduction examines the habitats of the Masai Mara
  • Easy-to-use habitat-based layout makes exciting birdwatching easy

First published in 2012.

Browse Our New History 2018 Catalog

Our 2018 History catalog includes a unique, multi-faceted account of Soviet Russia through the lens of a vast Moscow apartment building, the story of the rich and complex encounter between Enlightenment Europe and the civilizations to its east, and the unexpected roots of the science of heredity in nineteenth century insane asylums.

If you will be at AHA 2018 in Washington DC, please join us at our booth on Friday afternoon for a reception to celebrate our latest publications:

Booth 332
4:30pm, Friday, January 5th

Or stop by at any time to pick up a copy of this catalog, and see our full range of titles in history.

Our lead history title this Fall is Yuri Slezkine’s extraordinary and monumental House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution. One reviewer in the London Review of Books has rightfully called it “a Soviet War and Peace.” The book tells the chilling story of how the building’s residents lived in their apartments and ruled the Soviet state until some eight hundred of them were evicted from the House and led, one by one, to prison or to their deaths.

House of Government, by Yuri Slezkine

Jürgen Osterhammel’s Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia brings the sights and sounds of this tumultuous age vividly to life and demonstrates how Europe discovered its own identity anew by measuring itself against the great civilizations of the East, from the Ottoman Empire and India to China and Japan.

Unfabling the East, by Jurgen Osterhammel

In history of science, Theodore Porter’s Genetics in the Madhouse: The Unknown History of Human Heredity tells the unknown story of how the collection and sorting of hereditary data in mental hospitals gave rise to the new science of human heredity.

Genetics in the Madhouse, by Theodore M. Porter

Find these new titles and many more in our History 2018 catalog.

Browse Our New Economics 2018 Catalog

Our new Economics 2018 catalog features new books from Dani Rodrik, Jean Tirole, Andrew W. Lo, and Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake, and many more. 

PUP at ASSA 2018

This year in Philadelphia we will be having something of an ASSA PUP bonanza with:
—Reception on Friday at 10am with our new director Christie Henry
—Reception on Saturday at 6pm with Richard Layard and Alan Krueger for The Origins of Happiness
—Competition for John Campbell’s Financial Decisions and Markets
—Samplers of Posner and Weyl’s Radical Markets
—Buttons for Jean Tirole’s Economics of the Common Good

Come and find us at booths 308/310, where you can pick up a copy of the catalog and see our full range of books in Economics.

Follow the conversation on Twitter, #ASSA2018

In Straight Talk on Trade, Dani Rodrik argues that unfettered globalization is undermining the ability of nations to achieve basic goals including prosperity, stability, and equity, and calls for a new global order that balances the global and national interests.

Straight Talk on Trade, by Dani Rodrik

Economics for the Common Good is Nobel Prize-winner Jean Tirole’s manifesto for a new economics that is fully engaged with the many challenges faced by modern society, and seeks to be a force for the common good.

Economics for the Common Good, by Jean Tirole

Are investors rational or irrational? Andrew W. Lo argues that, in real world markets, rationality and irrationality coexist, and proposes a new framework for understanding market behavior in Adaptive Markets.

The increasing share of intangible assets in the economy has ushered in a quiet revolution. In Capitalism without Capital, Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake uncovers the role of the intangible economy in the major economic changes of the last decade and consider its implications for the future.

Capitalism without Capital, by Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake

Find full details for all of these titles in our Economics 2018 catalog.

Insect of the Week: the Snowy Tree Cricket

Adapted from pages 48-49 of Garden Insects of North America:

The snowy tree cricket is a pale green species that occurs over a broad area of the northern U.S. and parts of southern Canada. It is particularly well known because it has been shown that it can be used to determine temperature, as a type of living thermometer, based on its rate of chirping, which varies reliably with temperature in a manner that has been quantified.

A female Snowy tree cricket. Photo credit: Jim Kalisch, University of Nebraska

The formula for determining temperature by chirping rate is known as Dolbear’s Law, after A. E. Dolbear, who first published on the phenomenon in 1897. The formula is T = 40 + N15 , where T is temperature (in Fahrenheit) and N is the number of chirps in 15 seconds.

Garden Insects of North America: The Ultimate Guide to Backyard Bugs
Second Edition
By Whitney Cranshaw & David Shetlar

This second edition of Garden Insects of North America solidifies its place as the most comprehensive guide to the common insects, mites, and other “bugs” found in the backyards and gardens of the United States and Canada. Featuring 3,300 full-color photos and concise, detailed text, this fully revised book covers the hundreds of species of insects and mites associated with fruits and vegetables, shade trees and shrubs, flowers and ornamental plants, and turfgrass—from aphids and bumble bees to leafhoppers and mealybugs to woollybears and yellowjacket wasps—and much more. This new edition also provides a greatly expanded treatment of common pollinators and flower visitors, the natural enemies of garden pests, and the earthworms, insects, and other arthropods that help with decomposing plant matter in the garden.

Designed to help you easily identify what you find in the garden, the book is organized by where insects are most likely to be seen—on leaves, shoots, flowers, roots, or soil. Photos are included throughout the book, next to detailed descriptions of the insects and their associated plants.

An indispensable guide to the natural microcosm in our backyards, Garden Insects of North Americacontinues to be the definitive resource for amateur gardeners, insect lovers, and professional entomologists.

  • Revised and expanded edition covers most of the insects, mites, and other “bugs” one may find in yards or gardens in the United States and Canada—all in one handy volume
  • Features more than 3,300 full-color photos, more than twice the illustrations of the first edition
  • Concise, informative text organized to help you easily identify insects and the plant injuries that they may cause

 

Season’s Greetings from PUP’s European office

See amid the winter snow the welcoming lights of the Foundling Museum in London where the European office held our annual holiday party. This was the fourth year that we have hosted this celebration and we are thrilled to see that it has become a significant date in many people’s calendars. We were delighted that our Director, Christie Henry, was able to join us this year and to welcome our guests amongst beautiful works of art from the Foundling Museum’s collection.

PUP’s Director Christie Henry welcoming our guests at the Foundling Museum

It was wonderful too that so many many authors, media contacts, and friends of the Press gathered together in the bleak midwinter and shared glad tidings of comfort and joy –as well as enjoying some delicious canapes and festive drinks.

The party came at the end of a week in which we saw three ships come sailing in with visitors from our China office as well as from our US office. Through the rude wind’s loud lament and the bitter weather (surprisingly heavy snow fell to welcome our colleagues) we had a series of extremely useful meetings, including our annual European Editorial Advisory Board meeting and a presentation from our China office, all of which will help us to work ever more closely together in our mission to be a global Press.

From PUP’s European office we send you all good wishes at the end of 2017 and hope that 2018 is full of joy and good books!

Guests at the holiday party in the beautiful surroundings of the Foundling Museum

 

Bird Fact Friday – Verreaux’s Eagle Owl

Adapted from page 165 of Birds of the Masai Mara:

Verreaux’s Eagle Owl is a huge owl of found in bush and open woodland. This is the largest owl in Africa and the third largest owl species in the world. It is very powerful and capable of killing prey such as small antelope, small cats and large snakes. They are highly territorial birds and adult males may fight to the death. Birds are occasionally encountered at night at some camps and lodges, as well as on night-drives in the conservancies.

Verreaux’s Eagle Owl is named after the French bird specimen collector J.P. Verreaux (1807-1873).

However, they are more often seen perched in open trees at first light or at sunset, when their distinctive silhouette stands out clearly. In the middle of the day, they will generally roost out of sight in a large tree. The deep, booming “hoo-hoooo” call is not dissimilar to that of the Southern Ground Hornbill and sometimes these birds are attracted to the calling owls. Young birds often call a painful, drawn-out “eee-errrr” that is repeated over and over.

Birds of the Masai Mara
By Adam Scott Kennedy

Birds of the Masai Mara is a remarkably beautiful photographic guide featuring the bird species likely to be encountered by visitors to the popular Masai Mara National Reserve in Kenya. With an eye-catching layout, easy-to-use format, and no-jargon approach, the book contains more than 300 stunning photographs covering over 200 species of birds and is accessible and informative, rather than purely identification-based. A handy, brief introduction provides visitors with background on the habitats of the national park, and the guide’s habitat-based approach makes it simple to identify any bird species according to where it is found. Based on the firsthand experiences of the author, Birds of the Masai Mara is an ideal companion to all those visiting the national reserve and to bird aficionados interested in learning more about the region.

  • The only photographic guide to focus solely on the bird species of the Masai Mara National Reserve
  • More than 300 remarkable photographs covering over 200 species
  • Accessible text explores bird species behavior and species etymology
  • A brief and handy introduction examines the habitats of the Masai Mara
  • Easy-to-use habitat-based layout makes exciting birdwatching easy

First published in 2012.

 

 

Insect of the Week: The Tobacco Hornworm

Adapted from pages 68-69 of Garden Insects of North America:

Tomato and tobacco hornworms spend the winter months in the pupal stage, within a chamber approximately 4–6 inches deep in the soil. Adult moths emerge in mid- to late spring and may migrate long distances. Their eggs resemble small pearls and are laid singly on foliage. The newly hatched caterpillars possess a horn that is nearly the same length as the body and subsequently pass through four to five additional larval instars over the course of about a month. Full-grown larvae burrow several inches into soil and create a cell in which pupation occurs.

Where these insects can successfully survive winter conditions there are typically two generations produced annually. The adults are very strong fliers and in more northern areas, incidence of tomato and tobacco hornworms from year to year may be strongly influenced by migrations of moths originating from more southerly areas.

An adult tobacco hornworm (Manduca sexta). Photo credit: John Capinera, University of Florida

Larvae develop into large caterpillars, with five pairs of prolegs and a flexible “horn” on the last segment. Most are generally green. Seven diagonal white stripes are present along the side of the tobacco hornworm, and the horn is usually red. Tomato hornworm has a series of V-shaped white markings along the sides, and the horn is often black. Less common dark green or even black forms of tomato hornworm may be present. Adults of both are strong-flying, heavy-bodied moths. The forewings may have a span of up to 5 inches and are generally gray or grayish brown with light wavy markings.

When it comes to hosts, tomatoes and tobacco are particularly susceptible to injury. Pepper, potato, and certain nightshade famil weeds are also hosts. Caterpillars chew leaves and can defoliate plants rapidly. Fruits, particularly green fruit, may also be chewed.

Garden Insects of North America: The Ultimate Guide to Backyard Bugs
Second Edition
By Whitney Cranshaw & David Shetlar

This second edition of Garden Insects of North America solidifies its place as the most comprehensive guide to the common insects, mites, and other “bugs” found in the backyards and gardens of the United States and Canada. Featuring 3,300 full-color photos and concise, detailed text, this fully revised book covers the hundreds of species of insects and mites associated with fruits and vegetables, shade trees and shrubs, flowers and ornamental plants, and turfgrass—from aphids and bumble bees to leafhoppers and mealybugs to woollybears and yellowjacket wasps—and much more. This new edition also provides a greatly expanded treatment of common pollinators and flower visitors, the natural enemies of garden pests, and the earthworms, insects, and other arthropods that help with decomposing plant matter in the garden.

Designed to help you easily identify what you find in the garden, the book is organized by where insects are most likely to be seen—on leaves, shoots, flowers, roots, or soil. Photos are included throughout the book, next to detailed descriptions of the insects and their associated plants.

An indispensable guide to the natural microcosm in our backyards, Garden Insects of North Americacontinues to be the definitive resource for amateur gardeners, insect lovers, and professional entomologists.

  • Revised and expanded edition covers most of the insects, mites, and other “bugs” one may find in yards or gardens in the United States and Canada—all in one handy volume
  • Features more than 3,300 full-color photos, more than twice the illustrations of the first edition
  • Concise, informative text organized to help you easily identify insects and the plant injuries that they may cause

Éloi Laurent on Measuring Tomorrow

Never before in human history have we produced so much data, and this empirical revolution has shaped economic research and policy profoundly. But are we measuring, and thus managing, the right things—those that will help us solve the real social, economic, political, and environmental challenges of the twenty-first century? In Measuring Tomorrow, Éloi Laurent argues that we need to move away from narrowly useful metrics such as gross domestic product and instead use broader ones that aim at well-being, resilience, and sustainability. An essential resource for scholars, students, and policymakers, Measuring Tomorrow covers all aspects of well-being, and incorporates a broad range of data and fascinating case studies from around the world: not just the United States and Europe but also China, Africa, the Middle East, and India. Read on to learn more about how we can measure tomorrow.

Why should we go “beyond growth” in the 21st century to pay attention, as you advocate, to well-being, resilience and sustainability?

Because “growth,” that is growth of Gross Domestic Product or GDP, captures only a tiny fraction of what goes on in complex human societies: it tracks some but not all of economic well-being (saying nothing about fundamental issues such as income inequality), it does not account for most dimensions of well-being (think about the importance of health, education, or happiness for your own quality of life), and does not account at all for sustainability, which basically means well-being not just today but also tomorrow (imagine your quality of life in a world where the temperature would be 6 degrees higher). My point is that because well-being (human flourishing), resilience (resisting to shocks) and sustainability (caring about the future) have been overlooked by mainstream economics in the last three decades, our economic world has been mismanaged and our prosperity is now threatened.

To put it differently, while policymakers govern with numbers and data, they are as well governed by them so they better be relevant and accurate. It turns out, and that’s a strong argument of the book, that GDP’s relevance is fast declining in the beginning of the twenty-first century for three major reasons. First, economic growth, so buoyant during the three decades following the Second World War, has gradually faded away in advanced and even developing economies and is therefore becoming an ever-more-elusive goal for policy. Second, both objective and subjective well-being—those things that make life worth living—are visibly more and more disconnected from economic growth. Finally, GDP and growth tell us nothing about the compatibility of our current well-being with the long-term viability of ecosystems, even though it is clearly the major challenge we and our descendants must face.

Since “growth” cannot help us understand let alone solve the two major crises of our time, the inequality crisis and ecological crises, we must rely on other compasses to find our way in this new century. In my view, the whole of economic activity, which is a subset of social cooperation, should be reoriented toward the well-being of citizens and the resilience and sustainability of societies. For that to happen, we need to put these three collective horizons at the center of our empirical world. Or rather, back at the center, because issues of well-being and sustainability have been around for quite a long time in economic analysis and were a central part of its philosophy until the end of the nineteenth century. But economics as we know it today has largely forgotten that these concerns were once at the core of its reflections.

Isn’t there a fundamental trade-off between well-being and sustainability? Can we really pursue those goals together?

That is a key question and the book makes the case that advances in human well-being are fully compatible with environmental sustainability and even that the two are, or at least can be, mutually reinforcing provided we think clearly about those notions. Well-being represents the many dimensions of human development and sustainability represents dynamic well-being. They are obviously related.

To use the words of Chinese Environment Minister Zhou Shengxian in 2011, “If our planet is wrecked and our health ravaged, what is the benefit of our development?” In other words, our economic and political systems exist only within a larger context, the biosphere, whose vitality is the source of their survival and perpetuation. If ecological crises are not measured, monitored, and mitigated, they will eventually wipe out human well-being.

Well-being without sustainability (and resilience understood as short-term sustainability) is just an illusion. Our planet’s climate crisis has the potential to destroy the unprecedented contemporary progress in human health in a mere few decades. As acknowledged by Minister Zhou, if China’s ecosystems collapse under the weight of hyper-growth, with no unpolluted water left to drink nor clean air to breathe, the hundreds of millions of people in that country who have escaped poverty since the 1980s will be thrown back into it and worse. But, conversely, sustainability without well-being is just an ideal. Human behaviors and attitudes will become more sustainable not to “save the planet,” but to preserve well-being. Measuring well-being, resilience and sustainability makes their fundamental interdependence even clearer.

 But do robust indicators of well-being and sustainability already exist? If so, what do they tell us about our world that conventional economic indicators cannot?

Plenty exist, the task now is to select the best and use them to change policy. This is really what this book is about. Think about health in the US. Simple metrics such as life expectancy or mortality rates tell us a whole different story about what has happened in the country in the last thirty years than just growth. Actually, the healthcare reform initiated by Barack Obama in 2009 can be explained by the desire to amend a health system in which the human and economic cost has become unbearable. The recent discovery by economists Angus Deaton and Anne Case of very high mortality rates among middle-aged whites in the United States, all the while GDP was growing, is proof that health status must be studied and measured regardless of a nation’s perceived wealth status. How is it that the richest country in the world in terms of average income per capita, a country that devotes more of its wealth to health than any other, comes close to last in the rankings with comparable countries in terms of health outcomes? Use different indicators, as I do in the chapter devoted to health, and the solution to the American health puzzle quickly becomes apparent to you: the ballooning of inefficient private spending has led to a system where the costs are huge compared to its performance.

Or consider happiness in China, which has seen its per capita income grow exponentially since the early 1990s, while happiness levels have either stagnated or dropped (depending on the survey) only to increase again in recent years when growth was much lower. If you look at China only through the lens of growth, you basically miss the whole story about the life of people.

Paying attention to well-being can also help us understand why the Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia in 2011, a country where growth was strong and steady but where civil liberties and political rights clearly deteriorated before the revolution. The same is true for the quality of life in Europe and in my hometown of Paris, where air pollution has reached unbearable and life threatening levels despite the appearance of considerable wealth. Measuring well-being and sustainability simply change the way we see the world and should change the way we do policy.

What sign do you see that what you call the well-being and sustainability transition is under way?

In the last decade alone, scholars and policy makers have recognized in increasing numbers that standard economic indicators such as GDP not only create false expectations of perpetual societal growth but are also broken compasses for policy. And things are changing fast at all levels of governance: global, national, local.

The well-being and sustainability transition received international recognition in September 2015, when the United Nations embraced a “sustainable development goals” agenda in which GDP growth plays only a marginal role. In the US, scores of scholars and (some) policy makers increasingly realize the importance of paying attention to inequality rather than just growth. China’s leaders acknowledge that sustainability is a much better policy target than explosive economic expansion. Pope Francis is also a force of change when he writes in the encyclical Laudato si, published in June 2015: “We are faced not with two separate crises, one environmental and the other social, but rather with one complex crisis which is both social and environmental.” and urges us to abandon growth as a collective horizon. Influential newspapers and magazines such as The Economist and NYT recently ran articles arguing that GDP should be dropped or at least complemented. Local transitions are happening all over the planet, from Copenhagen to Baltimore, Chinese provinces to Indian states.

How should students, activists and policymakers engage in “Measuring tomorrow?”

The book serves as a practical guide to using indicators of well-being and sustainability to change our world. The basic course of action is to make visible what matters for humans and then make it count. Unmeasurability means invisibility: “what is not measured is not managed.” as the saying goes Conversely, measuring is governing: indicators determine policies and actions. Measuring, done properly, can produce positive social meaning.

First, we thus need to engage in a transition in values to change behaviors and attitudes. We live in a world where many dimensions of human well-being already have a value and often a price; it is the pluralism of value that can therefore protect those dimensions from the dictatorship of the single price. It does not mean that everything should be monetized or marketed but understanding how what matters to humans can be accounted for is the first step to valuing and taking care of what really counts.

Then we need to understand that the challenge is not just to interpret or even analyze this new economic world, but to change it. We thus need to understand how indicators of well-being and sustainability can become performative and not just descriptive. This can be done by integrating indicators in policy through representative democracy, regulatory democracy, and democratic activism. Applied carefully by private and public decision-makers, well-being and sustainability indicators can foster genuine progress.

Finally, we need to build tangible transitions at the local level. Well-being is best measured where it is actually experienced. Localities (cities, regions) are more agile than states, not to mention international institutions, and better able to put in motion well-being indicators and translate them into new policies. We can talk, in this respect, after the late Elinor Ostrom, of a “polycentric transition,” meaning that each level of government can seize the opportunity of the well-being and sustainability transition without waiting for the impetus to come from above.

As you can see, so much to learn, do and imagine!

LaurentÉloi Laurent is senior economist at the Sciences Po Centre for Economic Research (OFCE) in Paris. He also teaches at Stanford University and has been a visiting professor at Harvard University. He is the author or editor of fifteen books, including Measuring Tomorrow: Accounting for Well-Being, Resilience, and Sustainability in the Twenty-First Century.

 

Follow Princeton Nature on Instagram

Princeton University Press is pleased to announce the launch of the Princeton Nature Instagram, an extension of the Princeton Birds & Nature social media channels we curate on Facebook and Twitter, as well as here on our blog.

Making use of the array of features offered on Instagram, we’ll be introducing our readers to the new books and perennial favorites on our expanding natural history list. Our popular Bird Fact Friday series, along with various recurring series like Big Pacific, will also make appearances on Instagram, where we can offer you a glimpse of the stunning illustration programs. We’re looking forward to showcasing our latest publications, and putting them into action on the various hiking trails, gardens, and scenic locations around Princeton. In addition, we’ll be holding giveaways, quizzes, and using the Stories feature to highlight our titles in new and exciting ways. You can expect information on our upcoming BirdGenie app, which will be available on supported Apple® or Android® smartphones and tablets in Spring 2018.

Follow us @princetonnature for the latest photos and videos from our Princeton Birds & Natural History titles. We look forward to taking you around the world, one photo at a time.

William A. P. Childs on Greek Art and Aesthetics in the Fourth Century B.C.

Greek Art and Aesthetics in the Fourth Century B.C. analyzes the broad character of art produced during this period, providing in-depth analysis of and commentary on many of its most notable examples of sculpture and painting. Taking into consideration developments in style and subject matter, and elucidating political, religious, and intellectual context, William A. P. Childs argues that Greek art in this era was a natural outgrowth of the high classical period and focused on developing the rudiments of individual expression that became the hallmark of the classical in the fifth century. Read on to learn more about fourth century B.C. Greek art:

Why the fourth century?

The fourth century BCE has been neglected in scholarly treatises with a  few recent exceptions: Blanch Brown, Anticlassicism in Greek Sculpture of the Fourth Century B.C.; Monographs on Archaeology and the Fine Arts sponsored by the Archaeological Institute of America and the College Art Association of America 26 (New York, 1976); and Brunilde Ridgway, Fourth-Century Styles in Greek Sculpture, Wisconsin Studies in Classics (Madison, WI, 1997).

One reason is simply that taste has been antithetical to the character of the century. Thus literary critics disparaged the wild reassessments of mythology by Euripides at the end of the fifth century as well as his supposedly colloquial language, and treated the sophists as morally dishonest.

Socially the century was marked by continuous warfare and the rise of  a new, rich elite. Individuals were as important, or more important, than society/community; artists were thought to have individual styles that reflected their personal vision. This was thought to debase the grandness of the high classic and replace it with cheap sensationalism and pluralism that defied straight-forward categorization.

The age-old hostility to Persia was revived, it seems largely for political reasons, while Persian artistic influence permeated much of the ornaments of the new, wealthy elite: mosaics, rich cloth, and metal work. At the same time Persia was constantly meddling in Greek affaires, which produced a certain hypocritical political atmosphere.

And, finally, Philip of Macedon brought the whole democratic adventure of the fifth century to a close with the establishment of monarchy as the default political system, and Alexander brought the East into the new Hellenic or Hellenistic culture out of which Roman culture was to arise.

Clearly most of the past criticism is true; it is our response that has totally changed, one assumes, because our own period is in many respects very similar to the character of the fourth century.

What is the character of the art of the fourth century?

On the surface there is little change from the high classical style of the fifth century—the subject of art is primarily religion in the form of votive reliefs and statues dedicated in sanctuaries. The art of vase-painting in Athens undergoes a slow decline in quality with notable exceptions, though it comes to an end as the century closes.

Though the function of art remains the same as previously, the physical appearance changes and changes again. At the end of the fifth century and into the first quarter of the fourth there is a nervous, linear style with strong erotic overtones. After about 370 the preference is for solidity and quiet poses. But what becomes apparent on closer examination is that there are multiple contemporary variations of the dominant stylistic structures. This has led to some difficulty in assigning convincing dates to individual works, though this is exaggerated. It is widely thought that the different stylistic variations are due to individual artists asserting their personal visions and interpretations of the human condition.

The literary sources, almost all of Roman date, do state that the famous artists, sculptors and painters, of the fourth century developed very individual styles that with training could be recognized in the works still extant. Since there are almost no original Greek statues preserved and no original panel paintings, it is difficult to evaluate these claims convincingly. But, since there are quite distinct groups of works that share broad stylistic similarities and these similarities agree to a large extent with the stylistic observations in the literary sources, it is at least possible to suggest that these styles are connected in some way with particular, named artists of the fourth century. However, rather than attributing works to the named artists, it seems wiser simply to identify the style and recognize that it conveys a particular character of the figure portrayed. This appears also applicable to vase-paintings that may reflect the styles of different panel painters. There are therefore Praxitelian and Skopaic sculptures and Parrhasian and Zeuxian paintings. Style conveys content.

The variety of styles as expressive tools indicates that there is a variety of content. A corollary of this fact is that the artist is presenting works that must be read by the viewer and therefore do not primarily represent social norms but are particular interpretations of both traditional and novel subjects: Aphrodite bathes, a satyr rests peacefully in the woods, and athletes clean themselves. In brief, the heroic and the divine are humanized and humans gain a psychological depth  that allows portraits to suggest character.

Was the cultural response to these developments purely negative as most modern commentaries suggest?

The question of the reception of art and poetry in the Greek world particularly of the archaic and classical periods has occupied scholars for at least the last two hundred years. It has been amply documented that artisans and people we consider artists were generally repudiated by the people composing the preserved texts of literature and historical commentary. For example, Plato is generally considered a conservative Philistine. Most modern commentators are appalled by his criticism of poetry and the plastic arts in all forms. Yet the English romantic poets of the late 18th and early 19th centuries thought Plato a kindred spirit. It was only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that the negative assessment of Plato’s relation to poetry and art became authoritative.  However one wishes to assess Plato’s own appreciation of poetry and art, it is eminently clear that he had an intimate knowledge of contemporary art. Equally his criticism of people who praise art indicates that precisely what he criticizes is what Athenian society expected and praised. It does not require a large leap to surmise that Plato is the first art critic with a sophisticated approach though somewhat disorganized. His student, Aristotle, had the organization and perhaps a more nuanced view of art, but it is perhaps not an exaggeration to suggest that Aristotle was not as sensitive to art as was his teacher.

The fact of the matter is that from Homer on, the descriptions of objects, though very rare, are uniformly very appreciative. For Homer the wonder of life-likeness is paramount, a quality that endures down to the fourth century despite the changing styles and patent abstractions before the fourth century. At least in the fourth century artists also became wealthy and must have managed large workshops.  So the modern view that artisans/artists were considered inferior members of society appears to be a social evaluation by the wealthy and leisured.

In the fourth century BCE Greek artists embark on on an inquiry into individual expression of  profound insights into the human condition as well as social values. It is the conscious recognition of the varied expressive values of style that creates the modern concept of aesthetics and the artist.

ChildsWilliam A.P. Childs is professor emeritus of classical art and archaeology at Princeton University.

Kyle Harper: How climate change and disease helped the fall of Rome

HarperAt some time or another, every historian of Rome has been asked to say where we are, today, on Rome’s cycle of decline. Historians might squirm at such attempts to use the past but, even if history does not repeat itself, nor come packaged into moral lessons, it can deepen our sense of what it means to be human and how fragile our societies are.

In the middle of the second century, the Romans controlled a huge, geographically diverse part of the globe, from northern Britain to the edges of the Sahara, from the Atlantic to Mesopotamia. The generally prosperous population peaked at 75 million. Eventually, all free inhabitants of the empire came to enjoy the rights of Roman citizenship. Little wonder that the 18th-century English historian Edward Gibbon judged this age the ‘most happy’ in the history of our species – yet today we are more likely to see the advance of Roman civilisation as unwittingly planting the seeds of its own demise.

Five centuries later, the Roman empire was a small Byzantine rump-state controlled from Constantinople, its near-eastern provinces lost to Islamic invasions, its western lands covered by a patchwork of Germanic kingdoms. Trade receded, cities shrank, and technological advance halted. Despite the cultural vitality and spiritual legacy of these centuries, this period was marked by a declining population, political fragmentation, and lower levels of material complexity. When the historian Ian Morris at Stanford University created a universal social-development index, the fall of Rome emerged as the greatest setback in the history of human civilisation.

Explanations for a phenomenon of this magnitude abound: in 1984, the German classicist Alexander Demandt catalogued more than 200 hypotheses. Most scholars have looked to the internal political dynamics of the imperial system or the shifting geopolitical context of an empire whose neighbours gradually caught up in the sophistication of their military and political technologies. But new evidence has started to unveil the crucial role played by changes in the natural environment. The paradoxes of social development, and the inherent unpredictability of nature, worked in concert to bring about Rome’s demise.

Climate change did not begin with the exhaust fumes of industrialisation, but has been a permanent feature of human existence. Orbital mechanics (small variations in the tilt, spin and eccentricity of the Earth’s orbit) and solar cycles alter the amount and distribution of energy received from the Sun. And volcanic eruptions spew reflective sulphates into the atmosphere, sometimes with long-reaching effects. Modern, anthropogenic climate change is so perilous because it is happening quickly and in conjunction with so many other irreversible changes in the Earth’s biosphere. But climate change per se is nothing new.

The need to understand the natural context of modern climate change has been an unmitigated boon for historians. Earth scientists have scoured the planet for paleoclimate proxies, natural archives of the past environment. The effort to put climate change in the foreground of Roman history is motivated both by troves of new data and a heightened sensitivity to the importance of the physical environment. It turns out that climate had a major role in the rise and fall of Roman civilisation. The empire-builders benefitted from impeccable timing: the characteristic warm, wet and stable weather was conducive to economic productivity in an agrarian society. The benefits of economic growth supported the political and social bargains by which the Roman empire controlled its vast territory. The favourable climate, in ways subtle and profound, was baked into the empire’s innermost structure.

The end of this lucky climate regime did not immediately, or in any simple deterministic sense, spell the doom of Rome. Rather, a less favourable climate undermined its power just when the empire was imperilled by more dangerous enemies – Germans, Persians – from without. Climate instability peaked in the sixth century, during the reign of Justinian. Work by dendro-chronologists and ice-core experts points to an enormous spasm of volcanic activity in the 530s and 540s CE, unlike anything else in the past few thousand years. This violent sequence of eruptions triggered what is now called the ‘Late Antique Little Ice Age’, when much colder temperatures endured for at least 150 years. This phase of climate deterioration had decisive effects in Rome’s unravelling. It was also intimately linked to a catastrophe of even greater moment: the outbreak of the first pandemic of bubonic plague.

Disruptions in the biological environment were even more consequential to Rome’s destiny. For all the empire’s precocious advances, life expectancies ranged in the mid-20s, with infectious diseases the leading cause of death. But the array of diseases that preyed upon Romans was not static and, here too, new sensibilities and technologies are radically changing the way we understand the dynamics of evolutionary history – both for our own species, and for our microbial allies and adversaries.

The highly urbanised, highly interconnected Roman empire was a boon to its microbial inhabitants. Humble gastro-enteric diseases such as Shigellosis and paratyphoid fevers spread via contamination of food and water, and flourished in densely packed cities. Where swamps were drained and highways laid, the potential of malaria was unlocked in its worst form – Plasmodium falciparum – a deadly mosquito-borne protozoon. The Romans also connected societies by land and by sea as never before, with the unintended consequence that germs moved as never before, too. Slow killers such as tuberculosis and leprosy enjoyed a heyday in the web of interconnected cities fostered by Roman development.

However, the decisive factor in Rome’s biological history was the arrival of new germs capable of causing pandemic events. The empire was rocked by three such intercontinental disease events. The Antonine plague coincided with the end of the optimal climate regime, and was probably the global debut of the smallpox virus. The empire recovered, but never regained its previous commanding dominance. Then, in the mid-third century, a mysterious affliction of unknown origin called the Plague of Cyprian sent the empire into a tailspin. Though it rebounded, the empire was profoundly altered – with a new kind of emperor, a new kind of money, a new kind of society, and soon a new religion known as Christianity. Most dramatically, in the sixth century a resurgent empire led by Justinian faced a pandemic of bubonic plague, a prelude to the medieval Black Death. The toll was unfathomable – maybe half the population was felled.

The plague of Justinian is a case study in the extraordinarily complex relationship between human and natural systems. The culprit, the Yersinia pestis bacterium, is not a particularly ancient nemesis; evolving just 4,000 years ago, almost certainly in central Asia, it was an evolutionary newborn when it caused the first plague pandemic. The disease is permanently present in colonies of social, burrowing rodents such as marmots or gerbils. However, the historic plague pandemics were colossal accidents, spillover events involving at least five different species: the bacterium, the reservoir rodent, the amplification host (the black rat, which lives close to humans), the fleas that spread the germ, and the people caught in the crossfire.

Genetic evidence suggests that the strain of Yersinia pestis that generated the plague of Justinian originated somewhere near western China. It first appeared on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and, in all likelihood, was smuggled in along the southern, seaborne trading networks that carried silk and spices to Roman consumers. It was an accident of early globalisation. Once the germ reached the seething colonies of commensal rodents, fattened on the empire’s giant stores of grain, the mortality was unstoppable.

The plague pandemic was an event of astonishing ecological complexity. It required purely chance conjunctions, especially if the initial outbreak beyond the reservoir rodents in central Asia was triggered by those massive volcanic eruptions in the years preceding it. It also involved the unintended consequences of the built human environment – such as the global trade networks that shuttled the germ onto Roman shores, or the proliferation of rats inside the empire. The pandemic baffles our distinctions between structure and chance, pattern and contingency. Therein lies one of the lessons of Rome. Humans shape nature – above all, the ecological conditions within which evolution plays out. But nature remains blind to our intentions, and other organisms and ecosystems do not obey our rules. Climate change and disease evolution have been the wild cards of human history.

Our world now is very different from ancient Rome. We have public health, germ theory and antibiotic pharmaceuticals. We will not be as helpless as the Romans, if we are wise enough to recognise the grave threats looming around us, and to use the tools at our disposal to mitigate them. But the centrality of nature in Rome’s fall gives us reason to reconsider the power of the physical and biological environment to tilt the fortunes of human societies. Perhaps we could come to see the Romans not so much as an ancient civilisation, standing across an impassable divide from our modern age, but rather as the makers of our world today. They built a civilisation where global networks, emerging infectious diseases and ecological instability were decisive forces in the fate of human societies. The Romans, too, thought they had the upper hand over the fickle and furious power of the natural environment. History warns us: they were wrong.Aeon counter – do not remove

Kyle Harper is professor of classics and letters and senior vice president and provost at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of The Fate of Rome, recently released, as well as Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275–425 and From Shame to Sin: The Christian Transformation of Sexual Morality in Late Antiquity. He lives in Norman, Oklahoma.

This article was originally published at Aeon and has been republished under Creative Commons.

Barry Eichengreen on How Global Currencies Work

At first glance, the modern history of the global economic system seems to support the long-held view that the leading world power’s currency—the British pound, the U.S. dollar, and perhaps someday the Chinese yuan—invariably dominates international trade and finance. In How Global Currencies Work, three noted economists provide a reassessment of this history and the theories behind the conventional wisdom. Read on to learn more about the two views of global currencies, changes in international monetary leadership, and more.

Your title refers to “two views” of global currencies. Can you explain?
We distinguish the “old view” and the “new view”—you can probably infer from the terminology to which view we personally incline. In the old view, one currency will tend dominate as the vehicle for cross-border transactions at any point in time. In the past it was the British pound; more recently it has been the U.S. dollar; and in the future it may be the Chinese renminbi, these being the currencies of the leading international economies of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty first centuries. The argument, grounded largely in theory, is that a single currency has tended to dominate, or will dominate, because it pays for investors and producers when engaging in cross-border transactions; specifically, it pays for them to do cross-border business in the same currency as their partners and competitors. This pattern reflects the convenience value of conformity—it reflects what economists refer to as “network externalities.” In this view, it pays to quote the prices of one’s exports in the same units in which they are quoted by other exporters; this makes it easy for customers to compare prices, enabling a newly competitive producer to break into international markets. It pays to denominate bonds marketed to foreign investors in the same currency as other international bonds, in this case to make it easier for investors to compare yields and maximize the demand for the bonds in question.

In what we call the new view, on the other hand, several national currencies can coexist—they can play consequential international roles at the same point in time. In the modern world, it is argued, network externalities are not all that strong. For one thing, interchangeability costs are low as a result of modern financial technology. The existence of deep and liquid markets allows investors and exporters to do business in a variety of different currencies and switch all but effortlessly between them—to sell one currency for another at negligible cost. The existence of hedging instruments allows those investors to insure themselves against financial risks—specifically, against the risk that prices will move in unexpected ways. Prices denominated in different currencies are easy to compare, since everyone now carries a currency converter in his or her pocket, in the form of a smartphone. These observations point to the conclusion, which is compelling in our view, that several national currencies can simultaneously serve as units of account, means of payment and stores of value for individuals, firms and governments engaged in cross-border transactions.

In our book we provide several kinds of evidence supporting the relevance of the new view, not just today but in the past as well. We suggest that the old view is an inaccurate characterization of not just the current state of affairs but, in fact, of the last century and more of international monetary history.

What exactly motivated you to write this book?
We were worried by the extent to which the old view, which pointed to a battle to the death for international monetary supremacy between the dollar and the renminbi, continues to dominate scholarly analysis and popular discourse. This misapprehension gives rise to concerns that we think are misplaced, and to policy recommendations that we think are misguided. Renminbi internationalization, the technical name for policies intended to foster use of China’s currency in cross-border transactions not just within China itself but among third countries as well, is not in fact an existential threat to the dollar’s international role. To the contrary, it is entirely consistent with continued international use of the greenback, or so our evidence suggests.

In addition, making a convincing case for the new view requires marshaling historical, institutional and statistical material and analyzing the better part of a century. We though this extensive body of evidence cried out for a book-length treatment.

To what revisions of received historical wisdom does your analysis point?
We use that historical, institutional and statistical analysis to show that the old view of single-currency dominance is inaccurate not just for today but also as a description of the situation in the first half of the twentieth century and even in the final decades of the nineteenth. In the 1920s and 1930s, the pound sterling and the dollar both in fact played consequential international roles. Under the pre-World War I gold standard, the same was true of sterling, the French franc and the German mark. Our reassessment of the historical record suggests that the coexistence of multiple international currencies, the state of affairs toward which we are currently moving, is not the exception but in fact the rule. There is nothing unprecedented or anomalous about it.

And, contrary to what is sometimes asserted, we show that there is no necessary association between international currency competition and financial instability. The classical gold standard was a prototypical multiple international and reserve currency system by our reading of the evidence. But, whatever its other defects, the gold standard system was a strikingly stable exchange-rate arrangement.

Finally, we show that, under certain circumstances at least, international monetary and financial leadership can be gained and lost quickly. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom that persistence and inertia are overwhelmingly strong in the monetary domain owing to the prevalence of network effects. It is contrary to the presumption that changes of the guard are relatively rare. It is similarly contrary to the presumption that, once an international currency, always an international currency.

So you argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that changes in international monetary leadership can occur quickly under certain circumstances.  But what circumstances exactly?
The rising currency has to confront and overcome economic and institutional challenges, while the incumbent has to find it hard to keep up. Consider the case of the U.S. dollar. As late as 1914 the dollar played essentially no international role despite the fact that the U.S. had long since become the single largest economy. This initial position reflected the fact that although the U.S. had many of the economic preconditions in place—not only was it was far and away the largest economy but it was also the the number-one exporter—it lacked the institutional prerequisites. Passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 corrected this deficiency. The founding of the Fed created a lender and liquidity provider of last resort. And the Federal Reserve Act authorized U.S. banks to branch abroad, essentially for the first time. World War I, which disrupted London’s foreign financial relations, meanwhile created an opening, of which the U.S. took full advantage. Over the first post-Fed decade, the greenback quickly rose to international prominence. It came to be widely used internationally, fully matching the role of the incumbent international currency, the British pound sterling, already by the middle of the first post-World War I decade.

The shift to dollar dominance after World War II was equally swift. Again the stage was set by a combination of economic and institutional advances on the side of the rising power and difficulties for the incumbent. The U.S. emerged from World War II significantly strengthened economically, the UK significantly weakened. In terms of institutions, the U.S. responded to the unsettled monetary and financial circumstances of the immediate postwar period with the Marshall Plan and other initiatives extending the country’s international financial reach. The UK meanwhile, was forced to resort to capital controls and stringent financial regulation, which limited sterling’s appeal.

What are the implications of your analysis for the future of the international monetary and financial system?
The implications depend on the policies adopted, prospectively, by the governments and central banks that are the issuers of the potential international currencies. Here we have in mind not just the dollar and the renminbi but also the euro, the Euro Area being the third economy, along with the U.S. and China with the economic scale that is a prerequisite for being able to issue a true international currency. If all three issuers follow sound and stable policies, then there is no reason why their three currencies can’t share the international stage for the foreseeable future—in effect there’s no reason why they can’t share that stage indefinitely. The global economy will be better off with three sources of liquidity, compared to the current status quo where it is all but wholly dependent on one.

In contrast, if one or more of the issuers in question follows erratic policies, investors will flee its currency, since in a world of multiple international and reserve currencies they will have alternatives—they will have somewhere to go. The result could then be sharp changes in exchange rates.  The consequence could be high volatility that would wreak havoc with national and international financial markets. So while a world of multiple international currencies has benefits, it also entails risks. Policy choices—and politics—will determine  whether the risks or benefits dominate in the end.

EichengreenBarry Eichengreen is the George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. His books include Hall of Mirrors, Exorbitant Privilege, Globalizing Capital, and The European Economy since 1945Arnaud Mehl is principal economist at the European Central Bank. Livia Chiţu is an economist at the European Central Bank.